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I. INTRODUCTION
In the most widely known court opinion on equal education oppor-
tunity, Brown v. Board of Education1, the Supreme Court of the
United States emphasized the importance of education as follows:
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for ed-
ucation both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to
our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very founda-
tion of good citizenship. [Ilt is a principal instrument in awakening the child
to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubt-
ful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.
2
Nearly fifty years have passed since the Supreme Court issued its
decision in Brown, yet many children continue to be deprived of an
equal education opportunity. The quoted statement from Brown has
become the focus for attempts to achieve equal education opportunity
through school finance litigation. In this effort to receive an equal ed-
ucation opportunity for students who have been deprived of that right,
lawsuits have been commenced in all but 5 of the 50 states. These
challenges on the basis of a denial of equal education opportunity to
students in the state have moved from a focus on racial discrimina-
tion, to the state-created finance formulas that determine how much
each school district has to spend on education. Traditionally, the
funding formula that provides basic state aid to school districts con-
sists primarily of property taxes imposed at the local level.3
The resulting amount provided to each school district is often de-
scribed as the per-pupil expenditure. The amount available for per-
pupil expenditure generally depends upon two main components: (1)
the amount contributed to each school district from the state collected
revenue and (2) the amount generated from taxable real estate in the
local school district. The claim in school finance litigation has been
that equalization of educational opportunities requires the establish-
ment of a financing system that does not directly link a district's per
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Id. at 493.
3. All states except Hawaii and Michigan rely on local property taxes to support
educational funding. Hawaii and the District of Columbia have only one school
district. See generally Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litiga-
tion, and the "Third Wave". From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151,
1151 n. 6, 1171 n.169 (1995) [hereinafter Heise, State Constitutions]; William E.
Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Deci-
sions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC.
219, 219 n.2 (1990).
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pupil expenditure to its taxable wealth. While in response to claims of
denial of equal education opportunity, the states could demonstrate
that they had not deliberately configured school districts to maintain
racially separate schools and schools that were noticeably inferior if
attended by minority students, challengers asserted they could
demonstrate that states created financing systems that resulted in an
inferior education to students in districts that had less real property
wealth than those with more real property wealth. Often the argu-
ment was that minority children resided in the property poor dis-
tricts.4 The references here to school finance concern education
revenue and payments for instruction, support services, and other ac-
tivities for kindergarten through high school (K-12). This includes the
operation of public schools, teachers' salaries, construction of school
buildings, the purchase and operation of school buses, and other
services.
Claims of lack of equity developed around the theory that all dis-
tricts should receive a relatively equal level of resources, based on rel-
ative need. The need for, and complexities of, school finance reform
has been considered by numerous scholars, advocates and econo-
mists.5 Some states attempted to address inequities in school revenue
available for per pupil expenditure by creating financing formulas
that required examination of the local district funds available for edu-
cation and then subsidizing each district with funds necessary to pro-
vide an education. States have utilized three basic methods to
contribute to the support of schools in attempting to correct dispari-
ties. First, the state may give flat rate grants of a specified amount on
a per-pupil or per-teacher basis regardless of a district's ability to
raise funds through the local tax base. Second, the state may enact a
foundation program under which the state will provide funds up to a
minimum guaranteed level for any district that is unable to raise that
level of money through local property taxes assessed at level specified
by the state. Third, the state may enact an equalization plan whereby
4. For a discussion of the view that too much reliance may be placed on Brown v.
Board of Education in school finance litigation since inequities can occur without
racial bias, see JOHN E. COONS, WILLIAM H. CLUNE III & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN,
PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 355-358 (1970). But cf. Bruce D. Baker
& Preston C. Green, Can Minority Plaintiffs Use the Department of Education
Implementing Regulations to Challenge School Finance Disparities?, 173 ED. L.
REP. 679 (2003); Maurice R. Dyson, Leave No Child Behind: Normative Proposals
to Link Educational Adequacy Claims and High Stakes Assessment Due Process
Challenges, 7 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 17-18 (2002); Denise C. Morgan, The New
School Finance Litigation: Acknowledging that Race Discrimination in Public Ed-
ucation is More than Just a Tort, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 99 (2001); Quentin A. Palfrey,
The State Judiciary's Role in Fulfilling Brown's Promise, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1
(2002); James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249 (1999).
5. For an early yet still relevant discussion of the economic theories which led to
school finance litigation, see CooNs, CLUNE & SuGARMAN, supra note 4.
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the state guarantees the same amount of money per-pupil to all dis-
tricts that tax themselves at the same rate.6 The various configura-
tions of these plans adopted by states often led to property poor
districts taxing themselves at a higher rate but still having less educa-
tional resources than wealthier districts. This situation precipitated
the start of school finance litigation. 7
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,8 the
plaintiffs, a class of Mexican-American parents, challenged the Texas
school finance system as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution.9 They claimed that the Equal Protection
Clause established a right to substantially equal funding for all school
districts within a given state. Therefore, it was asserted, the state's
finance system was unfair and denied an equal education opportunity
to students who were poor and resided in school districts with a low
property tax base. A successful outcome required a determination
that the plaintiffs had a right to an education and that state action
either deprived them of that right or substantially burdened it. The
constitutional claim in Rodriguez was based in large part on the work
of Professors John E. Coons, William H. Clune III, and Stephen D.
Sugarman. They developed the constitutional and economic analysis
for asserting the principle based upon the Equal Protection Clause
that: "[tihe quality of public education may not be a function of wealth
other than the wealth of the state as a whole."lo The United States
Supreme Court held that even though Texas "virtually concede[d]"11
that its system of finance failed judicial strict scrutiny, the finance
system did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court rea-
soned that the level of scrutiny required was not strict scrutiny be-
cause the finance system, which discriminated on the basis of property
wealth, did not work to disadvantage a suspect class or encroach upon
a fundamental right. Education was not a fundamental right under
the United States Constitution and the system was not "so irrational
6. See John E. Coons, William H. Clune III, & Stephen D. Sugarman, Educational
Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57
CAL. L. REV. 305, 313-17 (1969); Annette Johnson, State Court Intervention in
School Finance Reform, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 325, 328-30 (1979). See THOMAS B.
PARRISH, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE DIRECTORS OF SPECIAL EDUCATION, DE-
VELOPMENTS IN FUNDING SPECIAL EDUCATION 10 (2002) (reporting funding formu-
las across the US involving special education in 1999-2000 as pupil weights: 19
states, resource-based: 12 states, flat grant: 11 states, percentage reimburse-
ment: 7 states, and combination: 2), available at http://www.csef-air.org/papers/
NASDE%20Presentation.pdf.
7. See discussion infra Part III A.
8. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
9. U.S CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.")
10. COONS, CLUNE & SUGARMAN, supra note 6, at 311.
11. 411 U.S. at 16.
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as to be invidiously discriminatory."12 The Court noted that education
was not among the rights either explicitly or implicitly found in the
text of the Constitution.13
Three decades have passed since the 1973 Rodriguez decision.
During that time, under the belief that challenges to school finance
systems based upon the United States Constitution were foreclosed,
challengers began to focus on state constitutions as the basis for relief
and move from what scholars have referred to as the "first wave" of
school finance litigation that relied upon federal rights.14 The theo-
ries used in school finance litigation over the past three decades have
been described as occurring in three waves. 15 The first wave litigation
that relied on the United States Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause began in the 1960s and ended in 1973 with the Supreme
Court's decision in Rodriguez. The second wave is generally described
as beginning in 1973 with the New Jersey Supreme Court decision in
Robinson v. Cahill,16 and ending in 1989. The waves are typically de-
scribed as a first wave consisting of equality claims including reliance
upon the Federal Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, a second of equality claims based upon state equal protection
clauses, and the third and present wave of adequacy claims based
upon state education constitutional clauses. The legal theories used
in the second wave are based on the equal protection clauses of the
state constitutions. Second wave equity lawsuits are characterized as
seeking substantial equalization of education revenue. The litigation
strategy of "third wave" cases focuses upon the educational clauses
contained in state constitutions and began in 1989.17 Third wave ade-
quacy suits are characterized as seeking sufficient resources to pro-
vide an adequate education.
Since the Texas school finance formula challenged in Rodriguez
used a dual approach to collecting revenue to finance education that
was much like that used in most states, Federal Equal Protection
claims appeared to be foreclosed. Consequently, the subsequent liti-
12. Id. at 55.
13. Id. at 35.
14. See William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance
Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REv. 597 (1994)
[hereinafter Thro, Judicial Analysis].
15. See Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 14, at 598 n.4; William E. Thro, The
Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the
Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219, 222-31
(1990) (describing the first wave as 1971-1973, the second wave as 1973-1989 and
the third wave as beginning with the 1989 decisions by the state supreme courts
of Montana, Kentucky, and Texas declaring their respective school finance sys-
tems as unconstitutional) [hereinafter Thro, Third Wave].
16. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) (declaring that state constitutional provisions could be
the basis for school finance reform).
17. See Heise, State Constitutions, supra note 3; Thro, Third Wave, supra note 15.
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gationl 8 began as state equal protection clause claims. 19 Some chal-
18. See, e.g., Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, No. CV- 90-883-R, 1993 WL
.204083 (Ala. Cir. Ct. April 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of the Justices No. 338,
624 So. 2d 107, 110 (Ala. 1993) (reopened sua sponte and dismissed by the Ala-
bama Supreme Court in Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Siegelman on May 31,
2002, available at http://www.wallacejordan.com/decisions/Opinions2001/1000
951.pdf); Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391 (Alaska
1997); Kasayulie v. State, 3AN-97-3782 CIV (Alaska Superior Court, Sept. 1,
1999); Hull v. Albrecht, 960 P.2d 634 (Ariz. 1998); Roosevelt Elementary Sch.
Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc) (plurality opinion);
Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Lake View School Dist. No. 25 v.
Huckabee, 351 Ark. 31, 91 S.W.3d 472 (2002), cert. denied, Wilson v. Huckabee,
123 S.Ct. 2097 (2003); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 10 S.W.3d 892
(Ark. 2000); Lake View v. Huckabee, No. 1992-5318 (Chancery Court, Pulaski
County, Ark. May 25, 2001); Tucker v. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25, 917 S.W.2d
530 (Ark. 1996); DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983);
Serrano v. Priest ("Serrano II"), 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976); Serrano v. Priest ("Ser-
rano I"), 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d
1005 (Colo. 1982); Horton v. Meskill ("Horton III"), 486 A.2d 1099 (Conn. 1985);
Horton v. Meskill ("Horton I"), 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Coalition for Adequacy
and Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996) (per
curiam); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Idaho Schs. for Equal
Educ. Opportunity v. State ("ISEEO III"), 976 P.2d 913 (Idaho 1998); Idaho Schs.
for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ. ("ISEEO II"), 912 P.2d
644 (Idaho 1996); Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity by and through Eikum
v. Evans ("ISEEO I"), 850 P.2d 724 (Idaho 1993); Thompson v. Engelking, 537
P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill.
1996); People ex rel. Jones v. Adams, 350 N.E.2d 767 (Ill. 1976);:Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994); Rose v. Council for Better Educ.,
Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Charlet v. Legislature, 713 So. 2d 1199 (La. Ct.
App. 1998), remedial writ denied, 730 So. 2d 934 (La. 1998), reconsideration de-
nied, 734 So. 2d 1221 (La. 1999); Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Comm'r, 659 A.2d 854
(Me. 1995); Montgomery County v. Bradford, 691 A.2d 1281 (Md. 1997);
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); McDuffy v.
Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Milliken v.
Green ("Green I"), 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Milliken v. Green ("Green I"),
203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972), vacated by 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); East
Jackson Pub. Schs. v. State, 348 N.W.2d 303 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (per curiam);
Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993) (en banc); Committee for Educ.
Equality v. State ("CEE II"), 967 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1998) (en banc); Committee for
Educ. Equality v. State ("CEE I"), 878 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1994) (en banc); Helena
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989), amended, 784
P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990); State ex rel. Woodahl v. Straub, 520 P.2d 776 (Mont.
1974); Gould v. Orr, 244 Neb. 163, 506 N.W.2d 349 (1993) (per curiam); Clare-
mont Sch. Dist. v. Governor ("Claremont III"), 794 A.2d 744 (N.H. 2002); Clare-
mont Sch. Dist. v. Governor ("Claremont II"), 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997);
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor ("Claremont I"), 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993);
Abbott by Abbott v. Burke ("Abbott V"), 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998); Abbott v. Burke
("Abbott I"), 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985); Robinson v. Cahill ("Robinson VII"), 360
A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976) (per curiam); Robinson v. Cahill ("Robinson I"), 303 A.2d 273
(N.J. 1973); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y.
1995); Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today v. Cuomo, 655 N.E.2d 647 (N.Y. 1995);
Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d
249 (N.C. 1997); Britt v. N.C. State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. App. 1987);
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lengers were successful with this constitutional argument. However,
the mixed results of the "second wave" litigation led others to focus on
specific education clauses in the state constitutions and also to alter
the nature of the claims from demanding an equal education for all
students to that of demanding an adequate education for all students.
The change in focus in the litigation has resulted in the description of
the "third wave" of litigation by some as a shift from "equity to ade-
quacy."20 The focus on this shift has led some to reject the vitality of
equity claims in favor of adequacy claims. 2 1
Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994); DeRolph v.
State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997); Cincinnati Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Walter,
390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. State, 746
P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Coalition for Equitable Sch. Funding, Inc. v. State, 811
P.2d 116 (Or. 1991) (en banc); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976); Withers v.
State, 891 P.2d 675 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); Marrero v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110
(Pa. 1999); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); City of Pawtucket v. Sund-
lun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995); Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535
(S.C. 1999); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988); Tenn.
Small Sch. Sys. v McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Meno ("Edgewood IV"), 917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1995); Carrollton-
Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. ("Edgewood III"),
826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby ("Edgewood II"),
804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby ("Edgewood I"),
777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994);
Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997) (per curiam); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of
King County v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978) (en banc); Northshore Sch. Dist.
No. 417 v.-Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178 (Wash. 1974) (en banc); State ex rel. Bds. of
Educ. v. Chafin, 376 S.E.2d 113 (W. Va. 1988); Pauley v. Bailey, 324 S.E.2d 128
(W. Va. 1984); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Kukor v. Grover,
436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989); Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141 (Wis. 1976); Vincent
v. Voight, 589 N.W.2d 455 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998), petition for review granted, 602
N.W.2d 758 (Wis. 1999); Lincoln County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 985 P.2d 964
(Wyo. 1999); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995);
Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
19. For a listing of the results of the second wave cases, see Baker & Green, supra
note 4, at 680 n.9 & 10.
20. See, e.g., William H. Clune, The Shift from Equity to Adequacy in School Finance,
8 EDUC. POL'Y 376 (1994); Heise, State Constitutions, supra note 3; Jonathan R.
Werner, No Knight in Shining Armor: Why Courts Alone, Absent Public Engage-
ment, Could Not Achieve Successful Public School Finance Reform in West Vir-
ginia, 35 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 61, 78-79 (2002) (attributing increased
plaintiff success in court to the shift in focus from equity to adequacy).
21. For a recent list of decisions by states' highest courts and a designation of victory
by the plaintiff or state, see Paula J. Lundberg, State Courts and School Funding:
A Fifty-State Analysis, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1101, 1101 n.3 (2000). See also ADVOCACY
CENTER FOR CHILDREN'S EDUCATIONAL SUCCESS WITH STANDARDS (ACCESS), at
http://www.accessednetwork.org/statesmain.html (last visited June 8, 2003)
(maintaining an updated report and summary of cases). School finance litigation
has not been filed in Delaware, Hawaii, Mississippi, and Utah.
A lawsuit was filed in Iowa in April 2002. Coalition for a Common Cents Solu-
tion v. State, at http://www.jefferson-scranton.kl2.ia.us/cents/pdf/petition.pdf
(last visited June 8, 2003); see also Matthew M. Craft, Note, Lost and Found: The
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This article examines the vitality of equity arguments in lawsuits
that include rural school districts. Part II briefly explores the impor-
tance of a special consideration of the achievement of equal education
opportunity in rural schools. Part III reviews and explains the nature
of equity claims as a means to challenge funding formulas that pro-
vide basic state aid to school districts and compares the use of ade-
quacy claims as a litigation strategy. This part also argues that there
are not three distinct waves of school finance litigation. Part IV ad-
dresses the equity based theories in more detail, examines two specific
cases, and discusses the implications of these and other cases for fu-
ture school litigation and reform involving rural school districts. Part
V concludes the article.
II. EQUAL EDUCATION OPPORTUNITIES IN RURAL SCHOOL
As the fiftieth anniversary of the Brown decision approaches, there
are many children who have not achieved an equal education opportu-
nity and many of those children reside in small and rural school dis-
tricts. They are receiving inadequate and inequitable education
opportunities. In Brown, the Court noted that attempts to show that
schools were "equalized" involved a consideration of a number of "tan-
gible" factors, including buildings,22 curriculum, and qualifications
and salaries of teachers. 23 These factors are often raised in school fi-
nance litigation to demonstrate that districts that experience urban
poverty and rural conditions are dealing with challenges that are not
adequately considered in school finance formulas. This part of the ar-
ticle demonstrates the inequities that exist in funding rural schools
and the need for finance reform.
The demand for free public schools developed because, in the early
history of the United States, the only children who attended schools
were the ones whose parents could pay private tutors. State govern-
ments exerted little influence on schools until the passage of common
school legislation in the middle decades of the 19th Century. States
adopted constitutional amendments to require free or common schools
throughout the state, and state legislatures passed implementing leg-
Unequal Distribution of Local Option Sales Tax Revenue Among Iowa Schools, 88
IOWA L. REV. 199 (2002) (discussing the relevance of the Iowa lawsuit to rural
districts); In the Courts: Iowa Suit Challenges Use of Local Option Sales Tax,
Seeks Equitable and Adequate School Funding, 4 RURAL POLICY MATTERS 7
(2002).
A 1987 lawsuit filed in Indiana, Lake Central v. State of Indiana, No. 56 Col-
8703-CP-81 (Newton County Cir. Ct., Ind., filed 1987), was withdrawn after the
legislature commenced state school finance reform.
22. See generally Glen I. Earthman, School Facility Conditions and Student Aca-
demic Achievement, UCLA INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY, at http://repositories.cdlib.
org/idea/wws/wws-rr008-1002 (October 1, 2002).
23. Brown, 347 U.S. at 491.
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islation for support of the schools through general taxation.24
Throughout the 19th century, education mostly took place in small,
ungraded, rural one-room schools. The ungraded schools where a sin-
gle teacher taught children of different ages, abilities, and levels of
knowledge evolved into the graded school of homogeneous classes. Is-
sues of inequity based upon the funding provided to establish and
maintain the schools were recognized early in the country's history.
Efforts to reform school finance have been a constant throughout the
20th and 21st centuries. For example, in 1891 the Kentucky Constitu-
tion provided that funds were to be distributed to school districts
based upon the number of school age children, regardless of whether
they attended school.25 In 1941, the constitution was amended to re-
quire that a specified percentage of the funding be provided on
grounds other than population.26 Subsequently, in 1953 the constitu-
tion was amended to allow the legislature to adopt legislation for a
method to establish funding for schools which led to the state's 1954
Foundation program being adopted by the legislature to provide equal
educational opportunities throughout the state. 27 Kentucky began a
new process of reform after one of the leading school finance cases was
decided in 1989.28 Many states followed similar patterns.
As the court noted in Rodriguez with respect to Texas, when the
system of finance was created for many states they were predomi-
nately rural states, with population and wealth spread relatively
evenly throughout the state.29 The principles of representation and
governmental function at the lowest level were dominant at the time
that the earliest public schools were established. In this early devel-
opment of public schools, farm children attended small schools that
were voluntarily supported by rural localities. "As long as the popula-
tion and wealth of the state remained relatively evenly distributed,
24. Id. at 489-90.
25. THE KENTUCKY EDUCATION REFORM ACT: A CITIZEN'S HANDBOOK 5 (1994), availa-
ble at http://www.wku.edu/library/kera/handbook/handbook.htm (last visited
June 8, 2003).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 3.
28. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 214 (Ky. 1989). As a result
of the Rose decision's declaration that Kentucky's system of education finance
was unconstitutional, the Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990 was adopted.
For an excellent discussion of the educational reform in Kentucky, see Molly A.
Hunter, All Eyes Forward: Public Engagement and Educational Reform in Ken-
tucky, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 485 (1999).
29. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 7-8 (citing 1 REPORT OF GOVERNOR's COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC
SCHOOL EDUCATION, THE CHALLENGE AND THE CHANCE 35 (1969); TEXAS STATE
BOARD OF EDUCATION, A REPORT OF THE ADEQUACY OF TEXAS SCHOOLS 5-7 (1938);
JOHN E. COONS, WILLIAM H. CLUNE III & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE
WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 48-49 (1970); E. CUBBERLEY, SCHOOL FUNDS AND
THEIR APPORTIONMENT 21-27 (1905)).
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the system of local control and funding was effective."30 The indus-
trial revolution, shifts in population, and the location of businesses
and other taxable property led to disparities in taxable property, re-
sulting local revenue, and levels of expenditure available for educa-
tion. Small rural schools began to suffer from lack of resources. In
many cases, a system that was originally based upon a rural economy
developed into one that was unfair to rural communities.
The early schools were within walking distance of students' homes.
Walking distance could be anywhere from one-half mile to two miles
one way. The rural school was the nucleus for the neighborhood and
the school was also the center for the community social activities. 3 1
The shifts in population have resulted in the development of many
questions around the issue of the feasibility of maintaining small ru-
ral schools and the method for determining an appropriate level of
school finance. Rural schools become an endangered species when the
view is that bigger is better. A plea for more resources has often been
met with a responsive call for consolidation, combining rural schools
or rural school districts. While some view the closing and consolida-
tion of rural schools as a means to provide better educational opportu-
nity for students, imposed consolidation is a conflict-ridden issue in
rural communities since they generally have a history of community
cooperation and inclusiveness and a desire for sustainable small
schools.32 Rural communities have found support in recent studies
that demonstrate the benefits of small schools.33
Although nearly 40 percent of United States' public schools were in
rural and small towns in the 1998-99 school year and 26 percent of
public school students attended small, rural schools, rural schools at-
tracted only 23 percent of federaf education dollars and 26 percent of
30. Johnson, supra note 6, at 328.
31. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); THE SCHOOLS OF SAC
COUNTY, at http://www.rootsweb.com/-iaohms/schools/sac-schoolsl884.html (last
visited June 1, 2003) (citing WILLIAM H. HART, HISTORY OF SAC COUNTY, IOWA 128
(B.F. Bowen & Co. eds. 1914)).
32. See generally Robert L. Hampel, Historical Perspective on Small Schools, 83 PHI
DELTA KAPPAN 357, 360-61 (2002); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BOARDS OF
EDUCATION, RURAL EDUCATION: WHAT'S DOWN THE ROAD FOR SCHOOLS 7-8 (1996).
33. See, e.g., BARBARA KENT LAWRENCE, DOLLARS AND SENSE: THE COST EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF SMALL SCHOOLS, at http://ruraledu.org/docs/dollars.pdf (2002); Kieran
Killeen & John Sipple, School Consolidation and Transportation Policy: An Em-
pirical and Institutional Analysis, at http://ruraledu.orgdocs/killeen-sipple.pdf
(2000) (working paper for the Rural School and Community Trust); Patricia E.
Funk & Jon Bailey, Small Schools, Big Results: Nebraska High School Comple-
tion and Postsecondary Enrollment Rates by Size of School District, Nebraska Al-
liance for Rural Education (1999); see also Robert M. Bastress, The Impact of
Litigation on Rural Students: From Free Textbooks to School Consolidation, 82
NEB. L. REV. 9 (2003).
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the nation's total expenditures for public education.3 4 The fact that
the percentage of resources approximates the percentage of children
attending rural schools, as well as the fact that some rural school dis-
tricts receive the same per-pupil expenditure as other school districts
may lead some to conclude that there is no lack of equity in rural
schools. However, these figures alone do not accurately depict the se-
verity of the problem in rural schools. Another complicating factor re-
garding rural schools is the definition of "rural." The lack of a precise
and universally accepted definition has hindered the research on rural
schools and communities. 35
There are unique conditions existing in rural communities which
significantly affect education. Some of the significant factors which
affect the lack of educational opportunity in rural schools and should
be analyzed with respect to each state's finance system include: (1) the
percentage of the state's population that is rural; (2) the percentage of
rural children in poverty; (3) the percentage of children who are mi-
norities; (4) the average rural teacher's salary; and (5) the rural per
capita income.3 6 Although there can be no one single solution for ru-
ral schools because of the variants in these and other factors, there are
many similarities with the problems of rural school finance.
"Ruralism" is a term used by Professor Debra Lyn Bassett to de-
scribe a type of discrimination that may not be formally recognized
but nonetheless results in a denial of equal education opportunity to
rural children. 37 She poignantly describes the culture that has devel-
34. See SAVE THE CHILDREN-USA, AMERICA'S FORGOrEN CHILDREN: CHILD POVERTY
IN RURAL AMERICA 28, at http://www.savethechildren.org/afc/afc pdiLO2.shtml
(2002).
In 1998 and 1999 small and rural schools received a total of about 26 percent of
the total education revenue. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS,
U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC, PUBLIC ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY STUDENTS, SCHOOLS, PU-
PIL/TEACHER RATIOS, AND FINANCES BY TYPE OF LOCALE: 1998 AND 1999, available
at http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/ruraled/data/StudentTeacher.asp?home=comsup-
port (Sept. 2001). This figure includes small schools, rural schools located within
a central city of a metropolitan statistical area (MSA), as well as rural schools
located outside of an MSA. Id. This data is derived from the United States De-
partment of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core
of Data survey, and United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Cen-
sus, Survey of Local Government Finances, and other unpublished data. Id.
These percentages do not reflect the most recent definition of small, rural schools,
i.e. only open country and communities with fewer than 2,500 people. See ELIZA-
BETH BEESON & MARTY STRANGE, RURAL SCHOOL AND COMMUNITY TRUST, WHY
RURAL MATTERS: THE NEED FOR EVERY STATE TO TAKE ACTION ON RURAL EDUCA-
TION 2, at http://www.ruraledu.orgstreportpdWRM 2003.pdf (Feb. 2003).
35. See BEESON & STRANGE, supra note 34, at 2; Michael L. Arnold, Rural Schools:
Diverse Needs Call for Flexible Policies, Mid-Continent Research for Education
and Learning Policy Brief, at 1-2 (May 2000) (on file with the Nebraska College of
Law Library).
36. BEESON & STRANGE, supra note 34, at 3.
37. Debra Lyn Bassett, Ruralism, 88 IOWA L. REV. 273 (2003).
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oped in our country that favors urban and suburban success and life-
styles to the disadvantage of rural people. She discusses how this bias
manifests itself in the funding of rural education. One way that this
occurs is the use of average daily enrollment in school financing for-
mulas coupled with the fact that rural communities have a lower tax
base.38 She notes that this is complicated further by the existence and
"invisibility" of rural poverty that is rarely addressed by state and lo-
cal governments.39
Rural districts can often demonstrate that there is a problem of
equity and disadvantage affecting the education of rural children by
providing evidence that the districts have limited funding, poor facili-
ties, relatively low teacher salaries, few special program staff, and few
central office staff. For example, Pennsylvania Partnerships for Chil-
dren (PPC) recently released a report demonstrating that there is a
need to address educational opportunities in rural Pennsylvania. The
report shows that: more rural children (18 percent) than urban chil-
dren (15.5 percent) live in poverty; a single parent heads 24 percent of
all rural families; one in 12 rural children is born to a mother under
20; and one rural child in six is born to a mother who has less than a
high school education. These factors are further exacerbated by cir-
cumstances where although fewer rural high school students drop out
of school than the state average, only 18 percent of these dropouts
plan to get a GED; one rural infant in five is born to a mother who
used tobacco during pregnancy and there is only one primary care doc-
tor for every 358 rural children; compared to one per 184 children
statewide; and one pediatrician for every 3,636 rural children, com-
pared to one per 1,303 children statewide 4 0
Organizations in several states have conducted similar studies
that highlight the particular challenges facing rural school districts.
Some have developed novel solutions to address some of their
problems. For example, Alaska initiated a program that helps Alaska
natives and others already living in rural districts obtain teaching cer-
tificates. The educators work with the local school district, commu-
nity, and university while earning their credentials. 4 1 In a recent
38. Id. at 307 (citing SARAH DEWEES, IMPROVING RURAL SCHOOL FACILITIES FOR
TEACHING AND LEARNING, ERIC CLEARINGHOUSE ON RURAL EDUC. AND SMALL
SCHS., at http://www.ael.org/eric/digests/edorc998.htm (1999) (noting that fund-
ing is frequently tied to enrollment, and that rural districts usually serve fewer
children and tend to have lower property value assessments) (on file with the
University of Iowa Law Review)).
39. Id. at 303 (citing CYNTHIA M. DUNCAN, WORLDS APART: WHY POVERTY PERSISTS IN
RURAL AMERICA 201 (1999)).
40. PENNSYLVANIA PARTNERSHIPS FOR CHILDREN (PPC), MILES TO Go: THE WELL-BE-
ING OF PENNSYLVANIA'S RURAL CHILDREN, at http://www.papartnerships.orgRural
%20report.pdf (last visited June 3, 2003) (on file with the author).
41. Scrambling for Staff: The Teacher Shortage in Rural Schools, EDUCATION WORLD
(2000), available at http://www.education-world.com/a-admin/adminl42.shtml.
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national report, Save the Children-USA reports that "the education
provided poor rural children is often inadequate and substandard - in
part because there are too few rural teachers, and less money is spent
in rural schools than urban ones."42 The failure to attract qualified
teachers can have severe consequences. This failure can be mani-
fested in racist attitudes of unqualified teachers that cause children to
be overlooked in school which leads to their withdrawal or worse,
cause children to be diagnosed as having a behavior problem which
requires medication. 43
Further, as Professor Arthur Levine compellingly describes new
problems are being created by applying the new high stake standards
testing44 to rural schools without first improving school finance
systems:
The problem is that standards and testing do not improve failing public
schools ... located predominantly in inner cities and rural areas. When the
school-improvement movement began 20 years ago, America's suburban
schools were strong, and our... rural schools were poor. Today our suburban
schools are even stronger, and our urban and rural school systems, attended
primarily by low-income and minority children, remain poor.
Standards and tests make sense only after this infrastructure is in place. The
standards then become the template against which the cure must be mea-
sured, and the tests become the vehicle for evaluating whether the standards
have been met.
We will never improve our.., schools until we invest in highly qualified and
well-prepared teachers and administrators, programs that research confirms
really work, up-to-date curriculum materials and modem plants and facilities.
We do that for children in the suburbs. Do urban and rural children deserve
any less?4 5
42. SAVE THE CHILDREN-USA, AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN CHILDREN: CHILD POVERTY IN
RuRAL AMERICA 12, at http'//www.savethechildren.org/afc/afc-pdf_02.shtml
(2002).
43. Roberta Dunn, a youth leader in rural Arkansas gives this account:
There is no cultural sensitivity whatsoever in the schools here. Racism is
rampant. A large majority of our teachers are white in a mostly black
school, and many of them are not familiar at all with the black culture.
At our tutoring program, the kids do the work and do it well. And they go
back to school and get D's and F's, and after many conversations with
teachers, we still can't figure this out. And then there's the medication.
You wouldn't believe how many black children in our schools are put on
medication. They say that the kids need it, but I know it's because they
just can't control them.
SAVE THE CHILDREN-USA, AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN CHILDREN: CHILD POVERTY IN
RuRAL AMERICA 28, at http://www.savethechildren.orglafc/afc-pdfL02.shtml
(2002).
44. See infra text accompanying notes 100-103.
45. Arthur Levine, Tests Find USA, Not Students, Lacking, USA TODAY, January 8,
2003, at 13A. Arthur Levine is the president of Teachers College at New York's
Columbia University. In his article, he shows that many of the same arguments
regarding failing urban schools also apply to rural schools.
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III. EQUITY VS. ADEQUACY
Advocates pursuing school finance litigation reform do so to
achieve equity and adequacy. They seek to obtain access to both an
equitable and an adequate education for all public school children.
When the political branches of government, the governor and the leg-
islature, are viewed as failing to provide for this need, advocates seek
the aid of the courts through litigation. Focus on the theoretical shift
from equity to adequacy has led some educational reform advocates to
suggest that school finance litigation is no longer likely to result in
success if the plaintiffs rely on equity theories.
Advocates in a number of states have been successful in obtaining
an opinion from their state supreme court that there has been a fail-
ure to provide for equal education opportunity.46 The legal theories
relied upon by the successful plaintiffs have been used to categorize
the cases as either equity or adequacy claims. Plaintiffs in early
school finance cases framed their claims in terms of equity - i.e. the
denial of equal education opportunity. In 1971 in Serrano v.
Priest(I),47 the plaintiffs prevailed in state court. The court inter-
preted both the California State and Federal Constitutional Equal
Protection guarantees and found the school finance system was not
"fiscally neutral" because the resources available to educate children
were a function of school-district wealth, not the wealth of the state as
a whole. In their 1969 article, Professors Coons, Clune and Sugarman
had articulated the theories to support such a holding.48 Most schol-
ars have separated the goals of equity and adequacy into two distinct
theories, analyzed the past three decades of school finance litigation
46. See Opinion of Justices, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993); Roosevelt Elementary Sch.
Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994); DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist., 651
S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971), appeal after
remand, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S. 907
(1977), and opinion supplemented by Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303 (Cal. 1977);
Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Rose v. Council for Better Educ.,
Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of
Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, 769
P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989), opinion amended by 784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990); Clare-
mont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997); Abbott v. Burke, 575
A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997); Tennessee
Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Kirby ("Edgewood I"), 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Brigham v. State,
692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash.
1978); Pauley v. Bailey, 324 S.E.2d 128 (W. Va. 1984); Washakie County Sch.
Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
47. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (strict scrutiny used to hold that California's school
finance system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution).
48. Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 6. The Serrano I court stated that it had
relied upon the article as "a comprehensive article on equal protection and school
financing." Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1265 n.37.
[Vol. 82:133
2003] RETHINKING THE EQUITY VS. ADEQUACY DEBATE 147
into the three waves described above in Part I and cite Serrano 1 as
the beginning of the first of these three waves, ignoring the other
school finance litigation, which occurred before Serrano 1 and also re-
lied upon the Fourteenth Amendment. A few scholars recognize the
school finance litigation of the 1960s.49 This disagreement as to which
cases should be considered as defining the first wave of litigation is
only one of many reasons to question the categorization of school fi-
nance cases into three distinct waves.50
It is not uncommon that scholars describe litigation or reform mea-
sures in terms of "waves," attempting to find a neat categorical way to
describe the theories of reform or litigation attributable to a certain
period of time.51 The concept probably originates from oceanic terms
49. Baker and Green, supra note 4; Lundberg, supra note 21, at 1107 n.32; Ryan,
supra note 4, at 253 (citing RICHARD F. ELMORE & MILBREY WALLIN McLAUGHLIN,
REFORM AND RETRENCHMENT: THE POLITICS OF CALIFORNIA SCHOOL FINANCE RE-
FORM 35 (1982) as "describing the goals and motivation of early school finance
advocates"); Joseph S. Patt, School Finance Battles: Survey Says? It's All Just a
Change in Attitudes, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 547 (1999); Thro, Judicial Analy-
sis, supra note 14. Some early unsuccessful school finance cases are McInnis v.
Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 332 (N.D. Ill. 1968) and Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F.
Supp. 572, 574 (W.D. Va. 1969).
50. If the view is taken that a wave only begins when there is a success, the "first
wave" might accurately be considered as commencing with Serrano v. Priest I,
since it was the first case to overthrow a school finance system using the Four-
teenth Amendment. This appears to be the view of Thro when he first used the
term "third wave." See Thro, Third Wave, supra note 15 at 222-25. However, he
later describes the first wave as beginning in the 1960s. See Thro, Judicial Anal-
ysis, supra note 14.
51. See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection:
The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992) (discuss-
ing the environmental movement rise of the third wave); Richard L. Cupp, Jr., A
Morality Play's Third Act: Revisiting Addiction, Fraud and Consumer Choice in
"Third Wave" Tobacco Litigation, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 465 (1998) (discussing third
wave of tobacco litigation); Craig Haney, Riding the Punishment Wave: On the
Origins of our Devolving Standards of Decency, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 27
(1998); Douglas N. Jacobson, Note, After Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.: How
Wide Will the Floodgates of Cigarette Litigation Open?, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1021
(1989) (discussing cases of first and second waves of tobacco litigation); Reed R.
Kathrein, Privatizing Civil Justice: Commercial Arbitration and the Civil Justice,
System Y2k Litigation: The Plaintiffs Perspective, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 565
(2000); Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview
of Women's Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth
Century, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2017 (2000) (discussing feminist activism and scholar-
ship); Thomas D. Lyon, The New Wave in Children's Suggestibility Research: A
Critique, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1004 (1999); John Hayakawa Tor6k, The Story of
"Towards Asian American Jurisprudence" and its Implications for Latinaslos in
American Law Schools, 13 LA RAZA L.J. 271 (2002) (discussing critical race the-
ory); Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law and Private Rights of Ac-
tion, Book Review WAR AND ANTI-WAR: SURVIVAL AT THE DAwN OF THE 21ST
CENTURY, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 421 2000 (discussing waves of human rights litiga-
tion); Major Susan S. Gibson, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
and is meant to convey the idea that some powerful force or momen-
tum has occurred that causes a change in the law.5 2 The problem is
that quite often these waves of reform or litigation are often not so
clearly definable. Such is the case with school finance litigation. The
theories used in school finance cases are overlapping and most seek
the same remedy: equal education opportunity. In her 1979 article,
during the "second wave" of equity litigation, Professor Johnson stated
that the analysis in recent state court decisions "is directed not at the
method of distribution of state funds but at the adequacy of the fund-
ing with the aim of compelling the state to fund all public education at
a higher level. 53 Although discussing a shift from equity to adequacy,
another scholar speaks in terms of equity when noting that state edu-
cation adequacy could be viewed from the perspective of "vertical eq-
uity."54 Success in school finance litigation is probably more
attributable to the economic, political and social conditions existing in
a state at the time a court is considering a case rather than a shift in
the plaintiffs' reliance on a theory of equity or adequacy.
This part discusses the interrelationship of equity and adequacy
claims and suggests that contrary to the view of some, the use of eq-
uity claims in school finance cases remains a viable option. First, it is
helpful to further clarify the references to equity and adequacy. Eq-
uity claims consist of issues of both pupil and taxpayer equity. Pupil
equity focuses on providing every student the same basic educational
opportunity, wherever they happen to attend school. Existing dispari-
ties have often been expressed in terms of per-pupil expenditure. Tax-
payer equity focuses on fiscal neutrality with an aim that every
community is able to provide basic educational opportunity with a
similar tax effort relative to its ability to pay. The focus of adequacy is
the provision to every student the support necessary to achieve a spec-
ified level of academic performance mandated by state standards. The
adequacy theory in litigation has also been referred to as the quality
theory because plaintiffs claim that the education of some children is
inadequate based upon the failure of their education to meet the state
quality standards.55
21st Century, 146 MIL. L. REv. 288 (1994) (book review) (discussing waves of eco-
nomic development and warfare).
52. For a discussion of the relationship of other oceanic terms to the concept of waves,
see Craig Haney, Riding the Punishment Wave: On the Origins of Our Devolving
Standards of Decency, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 27, 44 (1998) (discussing
groundswells, waves and tsunamis).
53. Johnson, supra note 6, at 325 (emphasis added).
54. See Julie K Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 493, 495-96 (1995).
55. See, e.g., William E. Thro, Commentary: Judicial Paradigms of Educational
Equality, 174 EDUC. LAw REP. 1, 33 (2003) [hereinafter Thro, Judicial Para-
digms]; Matthew M. Craft, Note, Lost and Found: The Unequal Distribution of
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A. Equity Finance Litigation
Equity claims allege that children attending public schools are de-
prived of the right to an equal education opportunity.56 Plaintiffs look
to the Federal Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 5 7 as well as state equal protection clauses5 8 as one basis for re-
lief. If everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal
protection and benefit of the law, and equality includes the full and
equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms, when the education oppor-
tunity provided is not equal, some children are deprived of equal pro-
tection of the laws. Thus, school finance reform is sought under the
principle that legislative action and other measures should be taken to
achieve equality and protect school children who are disadvantaged by
unfair discrimination.
Issues that arise when pursuing equal protection claims include:
(1) whether education is a right protected by the Constitution; (2)
whether there is a state equal protection clause; (3) if there is a pro-
tected right, what level of scrutiny must the court apply to legislative
action; (4) whether the plaintiffs are protected; and (5) if a violation is
found, what is the appropriate remedy that the court should order.
The history of the establishment of public education as discussed
above in Part II complicates whether education is a right protected by
the United States Constitution. As the Supreme Court noted in
Brown, "it is not surprising that there should be so little in the history
of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public
education." 59 In Rodriguez, the Court noted that a number of courts
had ruled that a state's existing finance formula was unconstitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment because the finance scheme did not
assure "equal opportunity" for school children throughout the state. 60
One of these first wave cases cited was the 1971 Serrano decision by
the California Supreme Court. There, the California Supreme Court
Local Option Sales Tax Revenue Among Iowa Schools, 88 IowA L. REV. 199, 206
(2002).
56. See Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 14, at 600-01 (referring to these claims as
"equality suits" seeking "the same amount of money spent on their education, or
[asserting] that children were entitled to equal education opportunities").
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
58. The term "state equal protection clause" refers here to the number of different
types of equality guarantee provisions contained in state constitutions. Many
states, although not required to, use the same or similar analysis that the United
States Supreme Court uses with respect to the Federal Equal Protection clause.
See generally Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional
Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1985).
59. 347 U.S. 483, 490 (1954).
60. 411 U.S. at 18-9 & n.48 (citing Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D.
Minn. 1971); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); Milliken v. Green, 203
N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972); Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law.
Div. 1972)).
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rejected the state's education finance system and insisted upon state-
wide funding equality.6 1
Following the United States Supreme Court decision in Rodriguez
in 1973, challengers began to rely on rights provided in state constitu-
tions. This was a clear departure from earlier litigation strategy,
which focused on Fourteenth Amendment claims. Generally speak-
ing, challengers began to rely on the argument that the state equal
protection clause guaranteed equal funding to school districts within a
state. Under this approach, plaintiffs could prevail if they could show
that: (1) education was a fundamental right; (2) that wealth is a sus-
pect class; or, if no fundamental right or suspect class was involved,
that (3) the finance scheme is irrational. Like the plaintiffs in the ear-
lier cases, these challengers pursued claims of equity and also alleged
that the quality of a child's education should not be dependent upon
where a child lived. Challengers also found constitutional support for
their claims in state education clauses. State constitutions, unlike
Federal Constitutional language, contain an explicit reference to edu-
cation.6 2 So, these new cases relied upon both state equal protection
and education clauses.
61. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
62. ALA. CONST. art XIV, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARiz. CONST. art. XI, § 1;
ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2;
CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA.
CONST. art. VIII, § VII, para. 1; HAw. CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1;
ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX, § 3; KAN.
CONST. art. VI, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 183; LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. 5; MICH. CONST. art.
VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; MIss. CONST. art. VIII, § 201; Mo. CONST.
art. XI. § 1(a); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1; NEV. CONST.
art. XI, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 83; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; N.M. CONST. art.
XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VII,
§ 1; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 3; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; OR. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3;
S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1;
UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 68; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH.
CONST. art. IX, § 1; W.VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; Wis. CONST. art. X, § 3; Wyo.
CONST. art. VII, § 1.
Scholars disagree as to whether Mississippi's clause is an education clause.
See, e.g., Michael Heise, The Courts, Educational Policy, and Unintended Conse-
quences, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 633, 635 (2002) (stating that "every state
constitution directly addresses education, though in varying degrees"); Molly
McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 311 n.5 (1991) (interpreting the Mississippi clause "as
requiring the Mississippi legislature to establish schools, although it does not
mandate the type of schools."); Palfrey, supra note 4, at 17 n.21 (2002) ("Unlike
the federal constitution, every state-except, arguably, Mississippi-has an edu-
cation clause."); Thro, Judicial Paradigms, supra note 55, at 30 n.105 (describing
the Mississippi state constitution as the only one that does not contain a state
education clause).
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The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v. Cahill63
was issued just thirteen days after Rodriguez and can accurately be
viewed as the start of a new wave of litigation that viewed Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection claims as essentially foreclosed by Rod-
riguez. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claims that education
was a fundamental right and that wealth was a suspect class under
the state equal protection clause, but declared the education financing
scheme in New Jersey unconstitutional on the ground that it violated
the students' rights to an equal education opportunity in contraven-
tion of the state constitution's "thorough and efficient education"
clause.6 4 In 1976, the California Supreme Court went further in Ser-
rano v. Priest 1165 and found that, based upon the California State
Constitution, education is a fundamental right and "discrimination in
educational opportunity on the basis of district wealth involves a sus-
pect classification."66 This decision was reached after Serrano v.
Priest I, was remanded. The court abandoned the Fourteenth Amend-
ment claim, but reaffirmed its strict scrutiny test, and held that the
California educational system was unconstitutional under the state
equal protection clause.6 7 This case gave hope to challengers in other
states that they might find relief from disparities in education based
upon the presence of education and equal protection clauses in their
constitutions. In 1978, the Washington Supreme Court joined New
Jersey in relying on the state education clause, rather than the state's
equal protection clause, to declare the state finance scheme unconsti-
tutional.68 These cases demonstrated that a claim for equitable treat-
ment could be based upon either a state equal protection clause or
education clause.
State legislatures were ordered to design a new system of school
finance. This included providing the definition of an education and
the necessary funding. When legislatures seek to address judgments
such as those in Robinson v. Cahill and Serrano, they pursue state
equalization schemes. This consists of efforts to provide more revenue
for spending in low-wealth districts, place legislative caps on wealthy
districts, or redistribute recaptured, "excess" revenues to poorer dis-
tricts. Thus, equity cases focus on both pupil and taxpayer equity for
funding of education. There are two types of pupil equity or equal ed-
63. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
64. Id. at 291. The New Jersey State Constitution requires that, "[t]he Legislature
shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system
of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between
the ages of five and eighteen years." N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1.
65. 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
66. Serrano 11, 557 P.2d at 951.
67. Id. at 951-53.
68. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 86 (Wash. 1978).
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ucational opportunity: vertical equity and horizontal equity.6 9 Verti-
cal equity focuses on the appropriate level of unequal treatment of
equals. The concept recognizes that not all students have the same
needs. It is argued that funding formulas should take these different
needs into consideration. Horizontal equity focuses on equal educa-
tion for equals and consists of equity formulations that attempt to
equalize revenues among school districts. These formulations require
an examination of the distribution of per-pupil resources across dis-
tricts. Equal educational opportunity is achieved when district prop-
erty wealth per pupil and its relationship with revenues for education
does not control the funding available for district education resources.
Rather, a combination of vertical and horizontal factors drives the de-
termination of the appropriate level of funding. With respect to equity
challenges that allege benefits provided students in the state are de-
nied to rural school students, the types of factors considered in Part II
above, along with local resources available, would be taken into ac-
count when assessing whether a state is providing an appropriate
level of resources for a rural district.
Taxpayer equity claims focus not only on the reduction in the fiscal
disparity between districts but the relative tax effort needed in dis-
tricts to generate an appropriate level of resources for education. 70
Taxpayer equity requires an examination of state and district
demographics and economics. Particularly relevant factors for rural
districts include assessed valuation of farm land, inequalities in fiscal
capacity, and disparity in local mill levies.
State valuation of property has traditionally been the primary fac-
tor used to determine a community's ability to pay for education. Ad
69. See generally James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation,
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 529, 539 n.29 (1999); Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Ade-
quacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493, 511-17 (1995). Erin E.
Kelly, Note, All Students Are Not Created Equal: The Inequitable Combination of
Property-Tax-Based School Finance Systems and Local Control, 45 DuKE L.J.
397, 402 & n.23 (1995) (citing LAWRENCE 0. Picus & LINDA HERTERT, U.S. DEP'T
OF EDUC., A SCHOOL FINANCE DILEMMA FOR TEXAS: ACHIEVING EQuITY IN A TIME
OF FISCAL CONSTRAINT 3 (working Paper No. 33, Jan. 1993)).
70. Macia A. Brown Thunberg, Raising Revenue for an Adequate Education in New
Hampshire, 20 VT. L. REV. 1001, 1031 n.200 (1996) (quoting John L. Myers, Out-
line of Remarks to Vermont Republican Legislators 4-5 (May 17, 1995) (listing
elements needed for an equitable school finance system to include that: "3) The
allocation of state aid is sensitive to the tax rates of school districts .... 9) Tax-
payers are treated equitably. Property is assessed uniformly. Low income tax-
payers are relieved of some of the obligation to pay property taxes. The burden of
paying for schools is shared equitably among homeowners and businesses. 10)
The state has some procedure to define and measure equity and periodically as-
sesses how equitable the school finance system is.") (outline on file with the Ne-
braska College of Law Library)).
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valorem or property taxes 71 assessed at a local level and raised by mill
provided the major portion of the education funds.72 Each school dis-
trict then levies taxes according to a state specified mill level. The
wide difference in local property can result in significant differences in
the dollars available to educate children if this geographical determi-
nation controls. The essence of equity claims is that standard school
finance systems that are dependent upon local property taxes do not
provide the appropriate capacity for all school districts to provide the
level of support needed for all students to meet specified standards.
Standard school finance systems are challenged based upon the heavy
reliance on local property taxes that results in poorer districts having
to raise local tax rates that were typically equivalent to or somewhat
higher than the average, but not sufficient to generate resources
needed for an adequate education. Therefore, a funding formula is
sought which recognizes differences in the ability to pay in different
parts of the state and inequalities between ability to pay and property
values. Income and cost of living are used as measures of ability to
pay. Taxpayer equity should also take into consideration all major
taxes available in the state, including income, sales, and property tax.
This consideration balances the tax-burden that is imposed on all tax-
payers.7 3 Each category of taxes should also be balanced between lo-
cal and state collection. For example, a school finance formula that
permits local school districts to collect sales taxes to generate school
revenue might work to the disadvantage of rural school districts if the
rural residents are required to pay a higher percentage of their income
than residents in richer districts.74
71. Ad valorem is Latin for "according to value." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 53 (7th
ed., 1999). The greater the value, the higher the assessment will be.
72. Ad valorem taxes are based on a percentage of the property's fair market value,
known as the assessed value times the millage rate. One mill is equal to one-
tenth of a cent. A millage rate is the tax levy rate, i.e. the rate of tax per thou-
sand dollars of taxable value or 0.1%. The ad valorem tax is determined by multi-
plying the taxable value by the millage rate and dividing by 1,000. For example,
$100,000 in taxable value with a millage rate of 5 would generate $500 in taxes.
The total revenue needed to be obtained from property taxes in a district is di-
vided by the total assessed value in the district to determine the amount that will
be generated per $1,000 of assessed value.
73. See generally ELIZABETH BURMASTER, Wisc. DEPT. OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, A RE-
PORT FROM THE COMMUNITY DIALOGUES ON INVESTING IN QUALITY EDUCATION
(2002), available at http://www.dpi.state.wi.us/dpi/sprntdnt/dialogue.html.
74. See Matthew M. Craft, Note, Lost and Found: The Unequal Distribution of Local
Option Sales Tax Revenue Among Iowa Schools, 88 IowA L. REV. 199, 201 & n.16
(2002) (discussing local option sales tax and the fact that rural residents may
spend more money in other districts where larger retail centers are located) (cit-
ing KENNETH E. STONE & GEORGEANNE ARTZ, AN ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSFER OF
FUNDS FROM WEAK RETAIL COUNTIES TO STRONG RETAIL COUNTIES IN IOWA VIA
LOCAL OPTION SALES TAXEs 1, 11 (1999), available at http://www.econ.iastate.
edu/retail/LOST% 20article.pdf).
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The process of equalization then considers both pupil equity and
taxpayer equity. It is possible that unless carefully balanced, taxpayer
equity could work to the disadvantage of pupil equity. For example,
legislation that equalizes the tax burden in all districts but does not
address pupil equity could result in fewer resources available than ex-
isted before a challenge. Without the appropriate balancing, efforts
may improve taxpayer equity without producing equality of schools
within districts. 75 The amount of money needed for education will
vary for different locations in response to different local needs and
conditions. These goals are reflected in the following description of
the 1993 funding system adopted in Indiana:
The primary goals of the new formula were taxpayer equity, funding equity,
and increased funding for at-risk students. Taxpayer equity was achieved by
equalizing the revenue (reward) that school corporations receive for their
property taxes (effort). The formula neutralized differences in wealth (mea-
sured by assessed valuation) and guaranteed in the long run that each school
corporation received the same revenue per student for the same property tax
rate levied. Funding equity was achieved by reducing disparities in spending
among school corporations. The formula accomplished this by providing an
equalization grant for school corporations that fell below the statewide aver-
age revenue per pupil. 7 6
A number of factors have led some to conclude that the second
wave litigation was not successful. Equity litigation met some resis-
tance from legislatures and taxpayers when plaintiffs were successful
and courts ordered that inequitable finance schemes be remedied.
Some taxpayers viewed the equity claims as causing courts to order
75. See generally Liz Kramer, Achieving Equitable Education Through the Courts: A
Comparative Analysis of Three States, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 31 (2002); John Augen-
blick, Augenblick, Van de Water, & Myers: Equity in Public School Finance, N.
CENT. REG'L EDUC. LABORATORY, at http://www.ncrel.org/sdrs/areas/issues/
envrnmnt/go/94-waug.htm (posted March 6, 1995) (referring to equity for taxpay-
ers and equity for children and noting that "some states emphasize one more
than the other" and adding that "[i]f all that were necessary was to replace the
lost property tax revenue with revenue from a tax that is perceived as fairer, the
problem for taxpayers might be solved. But that alone will not solve the pupil
equity problem, which takes more work."); CLEARINGHOUSE ON EDUC. MGMT.,
COLL. OF EDUC., UNIV. OF OR., MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN SCHOOL FINANCE EQuiTY:
A SHIFT TO SCHOOL-LEVEL EQuITY, at http://eric.uoregon.edu/trends-issues/fi-
nance/03.html (last visited June 8, 2003).
76. Rep. B. Patrick Bauer, A Democratic Response to the Indiana School Funding
Formula, 1 S. BEND POL'Y PERSP. 1 (Nov. 1995), at http://www.indiana.edu/-iepc/
bauer.html (last modified Mar. 8, 1997). Indiana's finance reform was not the
result of a court order. It was precipitated by the 1987 equity lawsuit, Lake Cen-
tral v. State of Indiana, No. 56 Col-8703-CP-81 (Newton County Cir. Ct., Ind.,
filed 1987), which was withdrawn. See generally Michael Heise, Equal Educa-
tional Opportunity Hollow Victories, and the Demise of School Finance Equity
Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Alternative Explanation, 32 GA. L. REV.
543, 629 (1998); Marilyn A. Hirth, A Multistate Analysis of School Finance Issues
and Equity Trends in Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan, 1982-1992: The Implica-
tions for 21st Century School Finance Policies, 20 J. EDUC. FIN. 163 (1994).
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"Robin Hood" remedies, 77 requiring increased property tax bills78 and
eliminating local control.79 Additionally, initial victories under the
second wave were followed by victories in less than half of the states
where claims were litigated.80
After the -1989 plaintiff victories in Montana, Texas and Ken-
tucky,8 ' some advocates and scholars viewed these successes as a way
to avoid some of the problems associated with second wave lawsuits.
The cases came to be described as the end of the second wave, 1973-
1988, and the start of the third wave of school finance litigation be-
cause the decisions were based solely on violations of state constitu-
tion education clauses.8 2
B. Adequacy Litigation
In Rodriguez, the State claimed that its funding formula provided
an "adequate" education,8 3 as required by the state foundation pro-
gram that had been enacted to fulfill the state's obligations under its
education clause. The Supreme Court noted that no proof had been
offered to refute this claim.84 In response to this argument, but based
upon state constitutional provisions, plaintiffs began to concentrate
their claims more on the types of outcomes they were seeking rather
than inputs. The relief sought was phrased in terms of the state's
duty to provide an adequate education.
Some commentators have attributed failures of "second wave" eq-
uity claims to objections based on local control and see the third wave
77. See generally Dyson supra note 4, at 58; Kramer, supra note 75, at 29-31 (discuss-
ing the Texas "Robin Hood" model); Morgan, supra note 4, at 143; William A.
Fischel, How Serrano Caused Proposition 13, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 607, 610 (1996);
Sarah S. Erving, Note, New York's Education Finance Litigation and the Title VI
Wave: An Analysis of Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 10 J.L. & POL'Y 271,
281 (2001).
78. See generally Kirk Stark & Jonathan Zasloff, Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Ser-
rano Really Cause Proposition 13?, 50 UCLA L. REv. 801 (2003).
79. See Baker & Green, supra note 4, at 681.
80. See id. at 680-681 (noting that during the second wave litigation "plaintiffs pre-
vailed in seven states but lost in 14 others.") Arkansas, California, Connecticut,
New Jersey, Washington, West Virginia, and Vermont are the seven successful
states.
81. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 214 (Ky. 1989); Helena
Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 688 (Mont. 1989); Edgewood Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989).
82. See, e.g., Baker & Green, supra note 4, at 681; Kramer, supra note 75, at 7; Pal-
frey, supra note 4, at 3 ("Part I argues that the 'adequacy' model of reform ad-
dresses many of the underlying concerns of the equity model without sharing its
methodological and strategic shortcomings.") (footnote omitted); Gail F. Levine,
Note, Meeting the Third Wave: Legislative Approaches to Recent Judicial School
Finance Rulings, 28 HAxv. J. ON LEGIS. 507, 542 (1991).
83. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973).
84. Id.
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adequacy claims as more successful8 5 and appealing because they em-
phasize educational opportunity and do not demand equal education
spending.8 6 However, with respect to the objection to interference
with local taxing and spending discretion, local control over finances
can be distinguished from local control over policy. A finance scheme
can be constructed that provides funding on a statewide basis but
leaves in place local control over spending. Even the local spending
discretion may be outdated. One commentator has stated that "[tihe
traditional image of 'participation and control of each district's schools
at the local level' does not, however, describe the realities of present-
day school governance."8 7
If equity claims are viewed as seeking equal educational opportu-
nity rather than equal per pupil expenditures, the second and third
waves of litigation merge into one wave, rather than shift from one to
the other. There are successful cases in each wave that have relied
upon the equal protection clause, or the education clause, or both.
Third wave successes have not been based exclusively on education
clauses. Some scholars have labeled a litigation strategy that includes
a claim based upon the education clause as "equity-plus."8 8 This is a
more accurate term to describe the successful litigation strategy that
has evolved. The cases are a combination of equity arguments, plus a
demonstration of the appropriate level of resources to fulfill the state's
constitutional obligation.
Observing that courts began to increasingly find in favor of plain-
tiffs, William Clune described the "shift" as moving to "equity-plus."8 9
The goal of equal education opportunity was affected by the move to
adopt student-outcome standards. The remedy for an inequitable fi-
nancing system no longer had to focus solely on per pupil expenditures
or taxpayer relief, but could include a claim that additional resources
85. See Kramer, supra note 75, at 7 & n.35 (noting successes for plaintiffs as "13 wins
out of 21 attempts, compared with 7 of 16 earlier") (citing Melissa C. Carr &
Susan H. Fuhrman, The Politics of School Finance in the 1990s, in EQUITY AND
ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 149 (Helen F. Ladd
et al., eds., 1999)).
86. See generally Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, Hollow Victories,
and the Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and
Alternative Explanation, 32 GA. L. REV. 543, 582 (1998) (describing "'deep seated'
convictions" regarding local control of education); Palfrey, supra note 4, at 20.
87. Michael A. Rebell, A Colloquium on Public Education Reform: Fiscal Equity in
Education: Deconstructing the Reigning Myths and Facing Reality, 21 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 691, 706 (1994-1995).
88. Michael A. Rebell & Jeffrey Metzler, Rapid Response, Radical Reform: The Story
of School Finance Litigation in Vermont, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 167, 172-180 (2002)
(describing the strategy of the lawyers in the Brigham case as "equity plus im-
plied adequacy" and the holding of the Vermont Supreme Court as "adequacy
plus equity").
89. WILLIAM H. CLUNE, The Shift from Equity to Adequacy in School Finance, 8
EDUC. POL'Y 376 (1994).
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were needed to meet the full cost required to achieve high minimum
outcomes that were constitutionally required. As Professor Heise de-
scribes the phenomenon, "educational standards and school finance
litigation converged in a way that enables school districts to gain fi-
nancially from their inability to meet desired achievement levels.
These failures are used in court to bolster legal claims that such
schools underachieve because their resources are inadequate and,
therefore, unconstitutional." 90 All school districts should reach or ex-
ceed an adequate level of education. For example, Maryland's ade-
quacy study states that "schools are being adequately funded when
the amount of funding provided is sufficient to allow students, schools
and school systems to meet prescribed State performance
standards."91
The third wave cases present similar problems regarding defini-
tions as existed with the second wave cases. This is illustrated by the
fact that some scholars have suggested that equity or inequality is
easier to define and prove than adequacy, 92 while others have sug-
gested the opposite. 93
A school finance reform strategy should include careful considera-
tion of the emphasis to be placed on a state education clause. As one
90. Michael Heise, The Courts, Educational Policy, and Unintended Consequences,
11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 633, 634 (2002).
91. MARYLAND COMMISSION ON EDUCATION, FINANCE, EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE: FINAL
REPORT x, at httpJ/mlis.state.md.us/other/education/final/2002_final-report.pdf
(2001).
92. See, e.g., Baker and Green, supra note 4, at 682 ("Because adequacy is such a
difficult term to define, some courts have either refused to declare such a stan-
dard, or deferred to the state legislatures' definition of an adequate education.
Such deference virtually guarantees that the plaintiffs will be unable to succeed
in their adequacy claim."); Kramer, supra note 75, at 11; James E. Ryan, Sheff,
Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 529, 549 (1999)
("[It is not at all self-evident why certain aspects of an adequate education...
are included within the courts' definitions, and others . . . are excluded."); Eric
Berger, Note, The Right to Education Under the South African Constitution, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 614, 641 (2003) (discussing South African school finance and stat-
ing that "[i]nadequacy is often subjective, relying on general standards"); Erin E.
Buzuvis, Note, "A" for Effort: Evaluating Recent State Education Reform in Re-
sponse to Judicial Demands for Equity and Adequacy, 86 CoRNELL L. REV. 644,
655-56 (2001) (seemingly arbitrary determinations of what constitutes adequacy);
Kevin Randall McMillan, Note, The Turning Tide: The Emerging Fourth Wave of
School Finance Reform Litigation and the Courts' Lingering Institutional Con-
cerns, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1867, 1884 (1998); see also Frank Macchiarola & Joseph
G. Diaz, Disorder in the Courts: The Aftermath of San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez in the State Courts, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 551, 556, 576-
77 (1996) (concluding adequacy alone may be a problem because the term "ade-
quate" can lead to stagnate or outdated standards).
93. See, e.g., Baker & Green, supra note 4, at 681 ("One reason for this lack of success
involves the difficulties in defining equality."); Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Financ-
ing Adequate Educational Opportunity, 14 J.L. & POL. 483, 495 (1998) (arguing
that adequacy approach is less complex than equity).
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commentator suggests: "A strong clause aids both adequacy-based and
equity-based challenges. It aids an adequacy challenge by raising the
rhetorical constitutional bar the state must meet. It aids an equity-
based challenge by making it much easier for a court to find that edu-
cation is a fundamental right within a Rodriguez analysis."9 4 Equity
claims do not preclude adequacy claims while equal protection claims
do not preclude adequacy claims. During the third wave some courts
have defined the state's obligation by relying only on the education
clause,95 or on both education and equal protection clauses.9 6 The
lack of clear distinction between the two waves also can be observed
by focusing on the language used to describe the litigants' strategy9 7
and by focusing on remedies. The goal of equal education opportunity
has been artificially forced into two litigation strategies: it becomes an
"equity" claim if reliance is placed upon an equal protection clause and
an "adequacy" claim if reliance is placed upon an education clause.
Lawsuits filed since 1989 have not exclusively relied upon education
clauses.9 8 In each instance, courts seek to determine (1) if there is a
right to an education; (2) what the right consists of; and (3) whether
the right has been violated. Some courts answer these questions with-
out relying upon an equal protection clause.
94. Joseph S. Patt, School Finance Battles: Survey Says? It's All Just a Change in
Attitudes, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 547, 554-555 (1999). For a description of
education clauses, see generally id. at 553-54; Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal
Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 777, 814-16 (1985) (describing four general categories of state education
clauses); William E. Thro, The Role of Language of the State Education Clauses in
School Finance Litigation, 79 EDuc. L. REP. 19 (1993) (summarizing education
clauses in state constitutions).
95. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d
575 (N.J. 1994). However, the New Jersey court found both standards in its
state's education clause.
96. See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 2002);
Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Campbell
County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995).
97. For example, both equal protection and adequacy language are used with respect
to Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997) ("Given these advantages and the
success other third wave plaintiffs have had with quality arguments under state
education clauses, the plaintiffs' claim in Leandro that they have a fundamental
right to 'adequate educational opportunities' under the North Carolina Constitu-
tion is well chosen.") Margaret Rose Westbrook, School Finance Litigation Comes
to North Carolina, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2123, 2161 (1995). See also Julie K. Under-
wood & William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litigation: A New Wave of Reform,
14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 517, 543 (1991) ("Many fiscal equity litigants in re-
cent cases have been able to effect reform through the use of education clauses in
state constitutions.").
98. One advantage to combining state equal protection claims with references to
state education clauses is that such litigation has fewer implications for other
areas of law than claims based solely on equal protection clauses. See Heise,
State Constitutions, supra note 3 at 1159.
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One remedy ordered by the courts has been the adoption of a state
foundation program, which the state can demonstrate was designed to
improve student outcomes. The outcomes would then serve as a mea-
sure of equality.9 9 This outcome focus is another reason some have
concluded that there has been a shift in school finance litigation. This
shift has been described by some scholars as shifting the focus of
school finance reform from inputs to outcomes. 0 0 The outcomes are
often linked to the adoption of high stakes assessment tests. The tests
are used as a proxy measure to determine if public schools are success-
ful and children are receiving an adequate education.
They are referred to as high stakes because they are used to hold
schools accountable and make crucial decisions about allocation of
funds for resources, such as the number of schools, teachers, and ad-
ministrators. 0 1 The tests are also used to make crucial decisions
about individual students, such as whether they will graduate from
high school. Although high stakes assessments have been criticized
for their negative affect on certain populations,10 2 they might also be
used as evidence to support claims for additional inputs (resources) to
generate the desired outcomes. Professors Ryan and Heise conclude
that high poverty schools generally have lower academic achievement
than low poverty schools.a0 3 Inequalities of inputs that might be
99. See, e.g., Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Fi-
nance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 151 (1995). William Clune has defined ade-
quacy as the achievement of high minimal outcomes for all students, see Clune,
supra note 20, at 376.
100. Lawrence 0. Picus, Perspectives Adequate Funding Courts Wrestle with a New
Approach to Fair and Equitable Funding for Education, AM. SCH. BOARD J.
(2002), at http://www.asbj.com/schoolspending/picus.html.
101. Michael Heise, The Courts, Educational Policy, and Unintended Consequences,
11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 633, 646-47 (2002).
102. High stakes assessments have been criticized for their affects on certain popula-
tions such as minority children and children in low wealth districts because the
assessment plans have been put into place before appropriate levels of funding
have been provided to assist with student performance. See generally Jennifer C.
Braceras, Killing the Messenger: The Misuse of Disparate Impact Theory to Chal-
lenge High-Stakes Educational Tests, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1111 (2002); Dyson supra
note 4; Betsy A. Gerber, High Stakes Testing: A Potentially Discriminatory Prac-
tice With Diminishing Legal Relief For Students at Risk, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 863
(2002); Christopher M. Morrison, Note, High-Stakes Tests and Students with Dis-
abilities, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 1139 (2000); AUDREY L. AMREIN & DAVID C. BERLINER,
ARIZ. STATE UNIV., THE IMPACT OF HIGH STAKES TESTS ON STUDENT ACADEMIC
PERFORMANCE: AN ANALYSIS OF NAEP RESULTS IN STATES WITH HIGH-STAKES
TESTS AND ACT, SAT, AND AP TEST RESULTS IN STATES WITH HIGH SCHOOL GRAD-
UATION ExAMs, at http://www.greatlakescenter.org/research.htm (last visited
June 8, 2003).
103. James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111
YALE L.J. 2043, 2103 (2002) (quoting MICHAEL J. PUMA ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., PROSPECTS: FINAL REPORT ON STUDENT OUTCOMES 73 (1997) ("The poverty
level of the school (over and above the economic status of an individual student) is
negatively related to standardized achievement scores.")).
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targeted as affecting outcomes include class size, teachers' credentials,
and facilities. Early in the "third wave" of litigation, Professor Clune
analyzed state supreme court decisions, particularly from Kentucky,
New Jersey, and Texas, and developed a three part remedy which rec-
ognizes the link between equity and adequacy claims. His remedy
provides for a focus on both inputs and outcomes:
(1) a base program of substantial equality of spending... ; (2) compensatory
aid calculated to produce substantial educational gains for children affected
by poverty . . . ; and (3) a set of performance-oriented policies designed to
improve the impact of educational resources on student achievement.1 0 4
The interrelationship of equity and adequacy can be demonstrated
by a hypothetical. Suppose a state remedy that is ordered is outcome
focused. If the state has two districts that have great disparities in
per pupil spending but are substantially equal on their state testing
assessments, the argument might be made that the state has fulfilled
its duty to provide an adequate education. Imagine, however, that in
both districts upon entering the elementary school the bright sunlight
shines in from above. In the school with a high per pupil expenditure
the light comes in from a beautifully designed skylight, while in the
school with low property wealth and low per pupil expenditure, the
light shines in from the numerous cracks in the ceiling of the deterio-
rating school building. Are the students receiving an equal education
opportunity?
School finance strategy will continue to embody both concepts: eq-
uity - educational resources and the tax burden to support them are
distributed fairly; and adequacy - resources provided at the level
needed to meet goals and standards.10 5 As Professors Patricia First
and Barbara De Luca conclude, reliance upon education clauses
"should not imply ... that educational policy has retreated from the
equity struggles or that the focus on adequacy is an improvement over
equity either in concept or goals."' 0 6
104. William H. Clune, New Answers to Hard Questions Posed by Rodriguez: Ending
the Separation of School Finance and Educational Policy by Bridging the Gap
Between Wrong and Remedy, 24 CoNN. L. REV. 721, 722 (1992). In a later article,
Professor Clune recognizes the interrelationship of equity and adequacy when he
describes later cases as "modern adequacy cases" and being "between the old eq-
uity theory and the 'true adequacy' approach." William H. Clune, Accelerated
Education as a Remedy for High-Poverty Schools, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 655,
658 & n. 14 (1995) (citing William H. Clune, The Shift from Equity to Adequacy in
School Finance, 8 EDUC. POL'Y 376 (1994) (describing the evolution of litigation
strategies used to reform inadequate school finance structures)).
105. See William E. Thro, The Significance of the Tennessee School Finance Decision,
85 EDUC. L. REP. 11, 24 (1993) (noting that the McWherter decisions demon-
strated the viability of an equity-based claim).
106. Patricia F. First & Barbara M. De Luca, The Meaning of Educational Adequacy:
The Confusion of Derolph, 32 J.L. & EDuc. 185, 189 (2003).
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IV. USING EQUITY BASED THEORIES TO REMEDY RURAL
SCHOOL FINANCE
In this part, "equity claim" is used in the more restrictive sense.
That is, an equity claim alleges that the state's method of financing
the public schools prevented some children from receiving an equal
education opportunity and that such denial violates the equal protec-
tion clause of the state constitution. Such a claim for equal education
opportunity can be based either upon (1) a focus on educational equity,
i.e. the denial of substantially equal per pupil expenditures or (2) tax-
rate equity, i.e. the imposition of a substantially unequal taxpayer
burden in order to finance local schools resulting from inequities in
tax bases or tax rates. As discussed above, equity claims are success-
ful if the plaintiffs convince the court of one of three basic points: (1)
education is a fundamental right; (2) wealth is a suspect class; or (3)
the state finance system is irrational.lo 7 The claim in most cases will
be coupled with an allegation that the state has violated the education
clause. The two cases discussed here demonstrate how an equal pro-
tection claim can be used successfully.
A. Tale of Two Cases: How Equity Claims were Successful
in Vermont and Wyoming.
1. Per-Pupil Equality: Brigham v. State'0 8
"A higher percentage of Vermonters and their public school students live in
rural communities than any other state, and it is near the top in the percent-
age of schools in rural communities (4th) and students in small rural schools
(3rd)."1 0 9
Vermont is a small rural state. 110 According to a 2000 Department
of Education report, Vermont ranks first in the percentage of students
attending rural schools (58%), and second in the percentage of schools
located in rural places (68.6%). 1 11 Therefore, Vermont school finance
litigation may have particular meaning for other rural communities.
The Supreme Court of Vermont has held that its state finance system
was unconstitutional in that it deprived many children of an equal
107. See Thro, Judicial Paradigms, supra note 55, at 31 n.108.
108. 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997).
109. See BEESON & STRANGE, supra note 34, at 69.
110. Vermont ranks 43rd in geographic area (9,615 square miles) and 49th in popula-
tion with 608,000 people. VERMONT ALMANAC, available at http://www.netstate.
comstates/alma/vtalma.htm (last visited May 24, 2003). Vermont is considered
the most rural state because a larger percentage of its residents live in communi-
ties of less than 2,500 than any other state. See BEESON & STRANGE, supra note
34, at 69.
111. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCA-
TION, STATE PROFILES OF PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION: 1996-
97 (2002), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2000 2000304.pdf.
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educational opportunity.112 As a result, Vermont is in the process of
trying to implement legislation that will provide equality in
education.113
In 1995, when an "equity" lawsuit was brought in Vermont, public
schools were financed like most public schools, through local property
taxes assessed in accordance with a state statute1 4 and funds were
distributed by the state based upon its education finance formula,
known as the Vermont Foundation Plan.115 The intent of the system
was to provide a per pupil expenditure in each school district to "pro-
vide at least a minimum-quality education."116 School districts with
greater property wealth received more property tax revenue, could
spend more per pupil, and arguably provided a better education to its
students. The lawsuit claimed that wealthy districts had an unfair
advantage over poorer districts in educating students. The lawsuit,
which was filed against the State of Vermont on behalf of student
plaintiffs Amanda Brigham and Spencer Howard, eight taxpayers,
and the Brandon and Worcester Vermont school districts, claimed
that the state's education finance system violated the equal protection
and education clauses of the Vermont Constitution and sought declar-
atory relief.ll More specifically, the students claimed that they were
deprived of their right under the state and federal constitutions to the
same equal educational opportunity as students residing in wealthier
school districts. The property owners claimed that they were required
to contribute more than their just share of funding for education. The
two school districts claimed that the state educational finance system
deprived them of the ability to raise sufficient money to provide the
equal education opportunities to their students as those provided to
students in wealthier districts and further required them to impose
disproportionate tax rates in violation of the federal and state consti-
tutions. The lawyers knew that they were facing an uphill battle since
112. Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997).
113. See generally Michael A. Rebell & Jeffrey Metzler, Rapid Response, Radical Re-
form: The Story of School Finance Litigation in Vermont, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 167,
182-88 (2002); Erin E. Buzuvis, Note, "A"for Effort: Evaluating Recent State Edu-
cation Reform in Response to Judicial Demands for Equity and Adequacy, 86 COR-
NELL L. REV. 644 (2001) (discussing seemingly arbitrary determinations of what
constitutes adequacy).
114. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 511 (Supp. 2000).
115. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 3441-49 (repealed 1997). See Brigham v. State, 692
A.2d 384, 386-88 (Vt. 1997).
116. Brigham, 692 A.2d at 388.
117. See Robert Gensberg, The Road to Equal Educational Opportunity for Vermont
School Children, 22 VT. L. REV. 1, 2 (1997) (ACLU lawyer); see also Michael A.
Rebell & Jeffrey Metzler, Rapid Response, Radical Reform: The Story of School
Finance Litigation In Vermont, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 167, 174-175 (2002) (noting that
plaintiffs did not want to rely on adequacy issues because of the difficulty in de-
fining adequacy and the fact that they wanted to avoid a long complicated trial).
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at the time that the lawsuit was filed, sixteen states had declared
their funding systems to be unconstitutional, but at least twenty
others had rejected such claims.118
In July 1996, the state filed a motion for summary judgment seek-
ing dismissal of the lawsuit. In October, trial court Judge John
Meaker of Lamoille Superior Court granted the state's motion for
summary judgment on two of the three constitutional issues raised by
the plaintiffs.": 9 He held that the claims based upon the Federal Con-
stitution were barred by the Supreme Court's Rodriguez decision, and
that the education clause of the Vermont Constitution did not estab-
lish a fundamental right to an education.12 o That clause provides in
relevant part:
Laws for the encouragement of virtue and prevention of vice and immorality
ought to be constantly kept in force, and duly executed; and a competent num-
ber of schools ought to be maintained in each town unless the general assem-
bly permits other provisions for the convenient instruction of youth.
1 2 1
This rejection led him to further conclude that the common bene-
fits clause of the Vermont Constitution did not require strict scrutiny
of the state education funding system and therefore the state was not
required to show that the system advanced a compelling governmen-
tal interest and was narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The com-
mon benefits clause has been described as the counterpart of, or
similar to, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and provides in pertinent part:
That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protec-
tion, and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for the particu-
lar emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of persons,
who are a part only of that community .... 122
The trial court denied summary judgment as to the claim that the
financing system violated the common benefits clause because it was
not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. In addi-
tion, the trial court let the claim proceed that taxpayers were required
to make disproportionate sums to fund education in violation of their
rights under the taxpayer equity clause of the state constitution123
which provides:
That every member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of
life, liberty, and property, and therefore is bound to contribute the member's
proportion towards the expense of that protection .... 124
118. Gensburg, supra note 117, at 2-3, n.7 & 8 (citing court opinions) (citations
omitted)).
119. Gensburg, supra note 117, at 12.
120. See Brigham, 692 A.2d at 386-87.
121. VT. CONST. ch. II, § 68.
122. Id. ch. I, art. 7.
123. See Brigham, 692 A.2d at 387.
124. VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 9.
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The parties appealed the judgment to the Vermont Supreme Court,
except for that portion dismissing the Federal Equal Protection
claims. In 1997, the Vermont Supreme Court, in Brigham v. State,125
agreed with the plaintiffs, reversed the trial court and without re-
manding for trial, declared the state's finance system unconstitutional
because of inequities caused in large part by locally approved tax le-
vies. The court described the state finance system and noted that
some districts spent twice as much per pupil as other districts,26
some districts spent less per student while paying higher tax rates,
and 60% of the total cost of public education came from local property
taxes. It characterized the state's foundation formula as failing to
eliminate wealth disparities and equalizing "capacity only to a level of
minimally adequate education."127 The Brigham court further stated
that it was "simply unable to fathom a legitimate governmental pur-
pose to justify the gross inequities in educational opportunities
. *..."128 The court held that regardless of the level of scrutiny applied
to the school finance system, the State failed to provide "a persuasive
rationale for the undisputed inequities in the ... funding system"1 29
and the system was constitutionally deficient. In reaching its conclu-
sion with respect to per pupil or educational equity, the court ex-
amined Vermont's Constitution to determine (1) if there was a right to
education and (2) whether there was a right to equal education oppor-
tunities. The court declined to rule on the issue of taxpayer equity
because it was not adequately briefed or argued by the State as to its
opposition to the trial court's denial of summary judgment on this
issue.
a. The Right to Education: Examining the Education Clause
The court traced the origin of the Vermont education clause in the
1777 constitutionl 30 as being derived from the 1776 Pennsylvania
Constitution. The clause was subsequently amended in 1786 to be
combined with the state's "virtue" clause.131 The education clause
125. 692 A.2d 384, 397-98 (Vt. 1997). That same year, the Ohio Supreme Court held
that its state had failed to provide an education funding system as required by
the state constitution. DeRolph v. Ohio, 677 N.E.2d 733, clarified by 678 N.E.2d
886 (Ohio 1997) (per curiam).
126. "In December 1994, the top 5 percent of school districts spent from $5,812 to
$7,803 per student, while the bottom 5 percent spent from $2,720 to $3,608."
Brigham, 692 A.2d at 389.
127. Id. at 396.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 390.
130. "A school or schools shall be established in each town, by the legislature, for the
convenient instruction of youth. . . ." VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § 40.
131. "Laws for the encouragement of virtue, and prevention of vice and immorality,
shall be made and constantly kept in force. . . ." Id. ch. II, § 41.
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then became very similar to the present education clause.132 As one of
the plaintiffs' lawyers explained it, a historical examination reveals
that in the virtue clause, the framers of the constitution were refer-
ring to the "virtue of the Enlightenment-in the sense of Locke or in
the sense of Benjamin Franklin."133 As he explained further, "it
meant . . . good citizenship;"134 and the combination of the two
clauses meant that the framers believed that good citizenship was di-
rectly linked to education.
These arguments were convincing to the court. The court found
that the framers' intent was to identify "fundamental human rights,"
such as education along with a governmental framework. At a time
when there were few state-supported public schools, a duty was im-
posed upon the state to maintain a public school system. The court
emphasized the importance of education to the responsibilities of citi-
zenship and concluded that education is mandated by the constitution
but the system of reliance on local property taxes is not. 135 The court
provided an extensive discussion of the importance of education to
prepare students for political participation in democratic self-govern-
ment and noted that early decisions of the court emphasized the im-
portance of education and the state's responsibility.
The Vermont Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the
move from a rural society to a more developed one in its consideration
of the state's long history of reliance on local control and local taxes to
finance school systems:
Means and methods that were effective in a rural society with limited develop-
ment of property resources and largely local industries may become ineffective
with the advent of major ski resorts and sizable industrial developments. The
towns where the employees of these businesses actually live and educate their
children bear the financial burden of development, while reaping none of the
tax advantages.
1 3 6
The court further emphasized that its review of the constitutional
history revealed that, "education was the only governmental service
considered worthy of constitutional status."137 The court, after having
established that the right to an education is present in the Vermont
Constitution and that such right was not being met by the existing
school finance system, then turned to the question of whether this fail-
ure was a violation of the State's common benefits clause.
132. "Laws for the encouragement of virtue, and prevention of vice and immorality,
ought to be constantly kept in force, and duly executed: and a competent number
of schools ought to be maintained in each town, for the convenient instruction of
youth. . . ." VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. II, § 38.
133. Gensburg, supra note 117, at 5.
134. Id.
135. Brigham, 692 A.2d at 392.
136. Id. at 395.
137. Id. at 391.
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b. Equal Education Opportunities: Applying Equal Protection
Principles
The court first referenced its previous holdings that the common
benefits clause was coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution and therefore as a general rule applied
a rational basis test to challenged statutory schemes13S with the more
searching inquiry of the strict scrutiny test applying only when either
a suspect classification or a fundamental right is affected. Then, with
respect to the educational finance system, the court concluded that
regardless of the level of scrutiny applied, the court was "simply una-
ble to fathom a legitimate governmental purpose to justify the gross
inequities in educational opportunities 139 that existed in Vermont.
In the court's view, the outcome would be the same under both a ra-
tional basis and a strict scrutiny standard of review. The financing
system was determined to be capricious.
The state's argument that the system was appropriate because it
was necessary to maintain local control over school districts was re-
jected by the court. The court found that local control over decisions
could still be maintained without reliance upon the existing financing
scheme. With respect to the State's argument that even if a constitu-
tional right to an education existed there was no requirement that it
had to be equal, the court agreed and held that "absolute" equality of
funding was not required.140 The court emphasized that in many situ-
ations differences in funding may be required to achieve reasonable
educational equality of opportunity.141
To support its conclusion that a "minimally adequate education"
did not meet the requirements of the common benefits clause, the
court looked to the words of Justice Marshall in his Rodriguez dissent:
"The Equal Protection Clause is not addressed to .. .minimal suffi-
ciency but rather to the unjustifiable inequalities of state action."14 2
The plaintiffs' lawyers had based their case upon Justice Marshall's
dissent. 143 The court admonished the state that "[elqual educational
opportunity cannot be achieved when property-rich school districts
may tax low and property-poor districts must tax high to achieve even
minimum standards."144 In holding that the constitution required the
State to ensure "substantial equality" of educational opportunity, the
court emphasized that cities and towns were not prohibited from
spending more on education, that differences in per-pupil expendi-
138. Id. at 395-96.
139. Id. at 396.
140. Id. at 397.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 397 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
143. Gensburg, supra note 117, at 15.
144. Brigham, 692 A.2d at 397.
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tures were permissible, and that it was the function of the legislature
and the court to determine the appropriate means to fulfill the consti-
tutional obligation.145 The case was remanded to the trial court to
maintain jurisdiction, until the legislature enacted valid legislation
that determined the specific means of achieving substantial equality.
The legislature was then faced with the task of enacting legislation
that addressed issues such as the level of state funding for public
schools, the sources of additional revenue, and the framework for dis-
tributing state funds. 14 6 The court referred to a number of variables
that could cause the difference such as district size, transportation
costs, and special education needs. The Brigham decision is consis-
tent with the analysis used by other courts in their determination of
the appropriate measure for determining compliance with the equal
protection requirement. Courts have generally concluded that equal-
ity means substantial equality between both the tangible and intangi-
ble factors of an education and compare a number of factors including
public funds, buildings, sites, accreditation, curriculum, faculty and
instruction, equipment and instructional materials, libraries, physical
and mental health and nursing services, extra-curricular activities,
and transportation. 147
2. Taxpayer Equity: Wyoming - Campbell County School District
v. Wyoming
a. The Wyoming Foundation Plan
"Wyoming's 172,438 rural people . . . constitute more than one-third of the
state's population . "148
Equality in funding has been pursued in Wyoming since the early sev-
enties. The state is in the process of implementing a newly enacted
centralized school finance system. The disparities that existed in per
pupil expenditures are being addressed by measures that also address
taxpayer equity. Under the Wyoming Foundation Program, the reve-
145. The Vermont Supreme Court cited the opinions of the Kentucky, Tennessee, and
Texas courts. "See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky.
1989) (state constitution requires that educational opportunities be 'substantially
uniform throughout the state'); McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 156 (state education
financing system must provide 'substantially equal educational opportunities');
Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 397 (state constitution requires 'substantially equal ac-
cess to similar revenues per pupil')." Brigham, 692 A.2d at 397-98.
146. A statewide property tax was enacted in 1997 to replace the local property tax.
The intent of the legislation was to equalize funding across school districts. This
meant that poorer districts would pay lower taxes and receive more state funds.
See Michael A. Rebell & Jeffrey Metzler, Rapid Response, Radical Reform: The
Story of School Finance Litigation in Vermont, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 167, 176-180
(2002).
147. See, e.g., Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137, 145-52 (Del. 1952), cert. granted, 344
U.S. 891 (1952), affd, Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
148. Beeson & Strange, supra note 34, at 74.
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nue available to a local school district is based primarily upon state-
wide generated revenue rather than a local property tax. The actual
distribution of the dollars is left up to the local school district. In the
1995-96 school year, Wyoming received 44.5% of its education revenue
from local funds, 49% from state and about 6.5% from federal.149 The
percentages in the 2001-2003 school year were 41.3% local and 50.1%
state.150 Although the equalization effort has not resulted in dra-
matic changes in percentages and is less than the national average,151
the newly adopted foundation plan attempts to incorporate taxpayer
equity as well as pupil equity and educational adequacy by centraliz-
ing school funding. The state legislature has attempted to construct a
model that balances taxpayer equity, pupil equity and educational ad-
equacy. The fiscal equity considers not just what students receive, but
how heavily the tax burden rests on residents of different
communities.
Locally imposed optional mill levies were eliminated and districts
may no longer retain more from their local property tax base than 100
percent of a state guaranteed per pupil revenue amount. Yet, no
statewide levy has been enacted and Wyoming does not have an in-
come tax.152 It also has only a nominal state property tax of 4 per-
cent. 153 The lack of income taxes and the unique severance tax154
source results in Wyoming not relying upon the common model for
state revenue where revenue flows from roughly equal use of income,
149. NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, RANKINGS OF THE STATES: 1996 (1997) (re-
ported in Penny L. Howell & Barbara B. Miller, Sources of Funding for Schools, 7
THE FUTURE OF THE CHILD J., No. 3 (1997), available at http:www.futureofchil-
dren.org/usr_doc/vol7no3ART3.pdf).
150. NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, RANKINGS & ESTIMATES: RANKINGS OF THE
STATES 2002 AND ESTIMATES OF SCHOOL STATISTICS 2003, at http://www.nea.org/
edstats/images/03rankings.pdf (2003).
151. In 1998-99, the state share of revenue rose to 48.7 percent while the local share
decreased. The federal share was 7.1 percent. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION
STATISTICS, 2001 Table 157, at http:/lnces.ed.gov//pubs2002/digest2OOl/tables/dt
157.asp (last visited June 8, 2003).
152. Nine states (Alaska, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Tennes-
see, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming) have no broad-based personal income
taxes. See UNITED STATES TAxEs.coM, at http://www.stateincometax.unitedstates
taxes.com/index.htm (last visited June 8, 2003).
153. Wyo. DEPT. OF REV. EXCISE TAx Div., GUIDE TO SALES AND USE TAX 1 (2001),
available at http://revenue.state.wy.us/contentroot/FAQ/Property%20Tax%20
System.pdf.
154. STATE OF WYOMING PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM, at http'//revenue.state.wy.us/content
root/FAQ/proptax/Property%20Tax%20System.pdf. Severance tax is levied by
the state for "severing" a mineral from the earth. These taxes are paid to the
state and are distributed to the general fund, the permanent mineral trust fund,
schools, cities, towns, highways, counties, and the water-development funds. In
2002, oil and gas contributed $267.1 million in Wyoming severance taxes. THE
PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION OF WYOMING, The Importance of Petroleum, 3 SUBLETTE
EXAMINER, no. 4 (Apr. 24, 2003).
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sales, and property taxes. Instead, payments are made to school dis-
tricts from a foundation program account. Revenue sources for the
account include the twelve mill statewide property tax authorized by
the Wyoming Constitution and dedicated for school purposes,155 rents
and other income from common school land,156 federal mineral royal-
ties and mineral severance taxes, state and local sales taxes, and
funds recaptured from school districts.
The Foundation Program provides a guaranteed level of funding to
every Wyoming public school district.157 The guarantee is essentially
a block grant and is based on a number of factors, including the num-
ber of students enrolled in each district in the prior year. 158 An Edu-
cation Resource Block Grant is allocated based on an analysis of the
cost of an adequate education. It is commonly referred to as a Cost
Based Block Grant Model because it is based upon the resources nec-
essary to deliver the "proper education" or "basket of goods and ser-
vices" to each student based upon actual cost. It is "cost-based"
because the amount a particular district receives depends on the spe-
cific characteristics of that district that raise or lower the actual costs
that that district faces. It is a "block grant" because most of the fund-
ing for operating local schools is received by school districts in the
form of a lump sum of money that school districts determine how to
spend. 15 9
Local revenue sources are considered in the determination of the
amount of the grant that a school district will receive from the state.
These revenue sources include federal mineral royalties, tuition reim-
bursements, Taylor Grazing Act160 funds, fines and forfeitures, and
motor vehicle registration fee allocations.161 The foundation program
155. School Foundation funding and the mandatory county levies are fixed by law at
twelve and six mills respectively. All school districts are required to impose a 25
mill levy counted as a local resource toward meeting a district's operational fund-
ing level guaranteed by the state. Wy. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-13-102, 21-13-303
(2003).
156. WYOMING EDUCATIONAL REFORM PROJECT, SCHOOL FINANCE SYNOPSIS, at http'/
legisweb.state.wy.us/school00/synopsis/syniiie.htm (last visited May 29, 2003).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See WYOMING STATE LEGISLATURE, MODEL TRAINING MANUAL, TRAINING FOR THE
REVISED COST BASED BLOCK GRANT (2002), available at http'//legisweb.state.wy.
us/2002/schoolfinance/map/trainman.pdf.
160. Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-16 (2000) (establishing grazing districts and
using a permitting system to manage livestock grazing in the districts; a portion
of the fees received from the grazing permits are returned to the state where the
grazing district is located). Wyoming law provides that the state treasurer shall
distribute the money to the counties in which the public lands are located. Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 9-4-401 (2003).
161. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 31-3-103 (2003). See WYOMING EDUCATIONAL REFORM PRO-
JECT, SCHOOL FINANCE SYNOPSIS, at http://legisweb.state.wy.us/school00/synopsis
syniiie.htm (last visited June 8, 2003).
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compares the amounts guaranteed to a district to other revenues
available to that district. This comparison results in individual dis-
trict entitlement amounts, i.e., payments from the state. It also deter-
mines if a district is a "recapture" district and subject to recapture
payments. If local resources exceed the guarantee, the district is a
recapture district and the excess amount is recaptured by the state
and deposited into the foundation account.
If a district's guaranteed amount exceeds local resources, the state
makes up the difference from the foundation account. 16 2 The states'
premise is that both pupil equity and taxpayer equity are achieved
through increased use of statewide taxes, reduced reliance on local
property taxes, and maintenance of a locally elected board of trustees
for some local discretionary spending authority.
The path to this model was difficult and there are some questions
remaining as to the effectiveness of the new statutory scheme. It has
taken three successive opinions from the Wyoming Supreme Court to
achieve this constitutionally valid legislation. This litigation and the
resulting foundation program are instructive as to the possible struc-
ture of claims that can be presented to a court in terms of taxpayer
equity.
b. From Hinkle to Campbell: Moving Through the Waves
A 1980 decision by the Wyoming Supreme Court held that unequal
funding among school districts was unconstitutional. In Washakie
County School District Number One v. Herschler,16 3 the court found
the entire Wyoming school finance system unconstitutional. The
court held that public education is a fundamental right under the Wy-
oming Constitution. In its instruction to the legislature, the court
stated: "whatever system is adopted by the legislature, it must not
create a level of spending which is a function of wealth other than the
wealth of the state as a whole."164 A 1971 opinion of the court had
forewarned the legislature of this possibility. In response to a chal-
lenge brought before the court in Sweetwater County Planning Com-
mittee for Organization of School Districts v. Hinkle165 regarding
school district reorganization, the court spoke in terms of taxpayer eq-
uity when it stated:
162. Phil Nicholas & Glenn Lang, Major Legislation Enacted at the 2002 Special Ses-
sion, in Wyo. LAw (2002).
163. Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980), cert
denied, Hot Springs County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1,
449 U.S. 824, (1980).
164. Washakie, 606 P.2d at 336. This idea had been proposed even before the wide-
spread school litigation. See COONS, CLUNE & SUGARMAN, supra note 4, at 340
("[t]he quality of public education may not be a function of wealth other than the
wealth of the state as a whole").
165. 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971).
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We cannot avoid being aware that the matter before us has been and is
difficult of solution because a tax advantage is to be had be being in a school
district where the assessed valuation is high. If ad valorem taxes for school
purposes were equalized throughout the state, as required by Art. 1, § 28, Wy-
oming Constitution, and by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, cases such as the one being
dealt with would not arise. The time has come when we can no longer ignore
inequalities throughout our state in the matter of taxation for school purposes.
We see no manner in which ad valorem taxes for school purposes can be
made equal and uniform unless it is done on a state-wide basis. In other
words, all property owners within the state should be required to pay the same
total mill levy for school purposes. 1 6 6
In Washakie, three school districts, the board members of the dis-
tricts as taxpayers and parents of children attending school, and sev-
eral children attending schools in Washakie District challenged the
Wyoming school finance system in a declaratory judgment lawsuit
filed in 1978, which was dismissed by the trial court. On appeal, the
Wyoming Supreme Court characterized the many claims brought by
the plaintiffs as raising one essential issue: "[Ils the Wyoming system
of financing public education in violation of the Wyoming
Constitution?"'16 7
The court first addressed the issue of taxpayer equity. The court
noted that it had considered this question in Hinkle and had made
suggestions to the legislature about how the problem might be ad-
dressed. The court then affirmed its conclusion reached in Hinkle that
"as nearly as practicable, funds derived from ad valorem tax levies
must be equally divided amongst the school districts of the entire
state."168 The filing of the Washakie case was viewed by the court as
"breath[ing] new life into [the] controversy."'169 The court had noted
when closing the Hinkle case that inequalities existing in the taxation
for school purposes which could not be remedied until some adversely
affected taxpayer maintained an action challenging the legislature's
actions.17o Although the court stated that it had been influenced by
the Serrano decision, it distinguished the decision in Hinkle by rea-
soning that it was not necessary to find that the public school financ-
ing system resulted in invidious discrimination against students of
poor persons, but rather it was sufficient to find that the Wyoming
system resulted in deprivations to all children in some districts. As
the court had noted in Hinkle, under these circumstances property
taxes were not equalized and the state tax scheme violated section 28,
166. Id. at 1236-37 (emphasis added).
167. Washakie, 606 P.2d at 314.
168. Id. at 319.
169. Id. at 320.
170. Id. at 319 (citing Hinkle, 493 P.2d 1050, 1051 (1972)).
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Article I of the Wyoming Constitution.171 The court continued its
analysis by examining other constitutional provisions and concluding
that the Washakie decision would not rest upon the tax provision. Al-
though Washakie was ultimately decided based upon the court's anal-
ysis of the state's education and equal protection clauses, it is clear
that taxpayer equity was a major factor that influenced the court.
Additionally, the court examined the existing foundation program
and the resulting apportionments and concluded that the program did
not adequately equalize the education funds available to each dis-
trict.172 The evidence considered by the court demonstrated that dis-
tricts with low property wealth consistently received less revenue per
pupil than the property rich districts and that income available to
some districts from sources other than foundation funds exacerbated
the disparity. The court reasoned that this evidence supported a con-
clusion that the school finance system violated the state constitution
by conditioning the right to an education upon wealth. The state's
"equal protection" and education clauses were violated.
Section 34, Article I of the Wyoming Constitution provides that:
"All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation," and has
been construed by the court as equivalent to the Equal Protection
Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion. 17 3 The court concluded that the emphasis placed on education by
the Wyoming Constitution led directly to the conclusion that the "edu-
cation for the children of Wyoming is a matter of fundamental inter-
est,"1 74 and therefore required the state demonstrate that the
foundation program satisfied the strict scrutiny test. The court's con-
clusion that education rises to a fundamental constitutional status
was based upon the education clause which states: "The Legislature
shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a complete
and uniform system of public instruction, embracing free elementary
schools of every needed kind and grade . ... "175 Although the court
recognized that the state legislature had made considerable efforts in
its attempt to construct a school equalization program, it warned "that
until the equality of financing is achieved, there is no practicable
method of achieving the equality of quality"176 required by the state
171. Hinkle, 491 P.2d at 1237 n.2 (stating that the Wyoming Constitution provided
that "[aill taxation should be equal and uniform.").
172. See Brigham, 606 P.2d at 329.
173. Washakie, 606 P.2d at 332 (citing Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67 (1978)).
174. Id. at 333.
175. WYo. CONST. art. VII, § 1. The court also cited Article 1, Section 23 which pro-
vides: "The right of the citizens to opportunities for education should have practi-
cal recognition. The legislature shall suitably encourage means and agencies
calculated to advance the sciences and liberal arts." Article VII, Sections 1-14
were also discussed as providing a broad outline of the public education system.
176. Washakie, 606 P.2d at 334.
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constitution and that the resources available to each district must be a
function of the wealth of the state as a whole. The court also made it
clear that it was not requiring that the per pupil expenditure be the
same in each district.177
After the court's decision in Washakie, the constitution was
amended in 1981 to reverse the amounts that the state and the coun-
ties were authorized to levy for educational purposes. 178 Thus, a
twelve mill levy became a state resource for the foundation account
and the county levy became six mill.1 79 Additionally, in 1983 the Wy-
oming Legislature implemented a system, which it characterized as
transitional while a study was being conducted. However, the Wyo-
ming Legislature never implemented the permanent system.
In the early 1990s, the state's four largest school districts chal-
lenged the state's funding system. The original plaintiffs were later
joined by a fifth school district and the Wyoming Education Associa-
tion. The plaintiffs alleged that the state legislature had failed to ad-
dress the funding inequities. In 1995, in Campbell County School
District v. State (Campbell 1),180 the Wyoming Supreme Court re-
versed the trial court's decision which partially upheld the state
formula.181 The Wyoming Supreme Court examined in detail the
foundation program, as had the district court, but found that all ele-
ments of the program were unconstitutional and that differences in
the funding and distribution formulas of the school finance system
were not based on differences in the cost of education. The court con-
cluded that wealthier districts were able to contribute more to the
funds available per pupil than poorer districts, which led to educa-
tional resource inequities.' 8 2 It stated further that "[an equal oppor-
tunity for a proper education necessarily contemplates the playing
field will be leveled so each child has an equal chance for educational
success."183 In the court's view, the program failed to take into ac-
count wide differences in town wealth and lacked any significant
equalizing state support. The 1983 program, therefore, violated the
Wyoming Constitution's equal protection and education provisions.
The court wrote an exhaustive examination of the Wyoming Con-
stitution's education provisions. In defining the legislature's obliga-
tion under the constitution, the court construed words that have been
construed by other states, including "efficient" and "thorough" and
177. Id. at 335.
178. WYo. CONST art. XV, § 17 (county levy for support and maintenance of public
schools).
179. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 21-13-303(a) (1987).
180. 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995).
181. Id. at 1243.
182. Id. at 1270.
183. Campbell 1, 907 P.2d at 1278.
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concluded that the state's system of financing created wealth-based
disparities in educational opportunity.' 8 4
The court considered the elements of an efficient and thorough ed-
ucation along with its discussion of the need for uniformity and or-
dered the legislature to: (1) design the best educational system by
identifying the "proper" educational package each Wyoming student is
entitled to have; (2) determine the cost of that educational package;
and (3) take the necessary action to fund that package.185 Educa-
tional opportunity under the foundation program was determined in
large part by the natural resources in a district. The court was ad-
dressing both pupil and taxpayer equity by suggesting a shift in re-
sources. This directive by the court has led some scholars
commentators to describe the Wyoming decisions as a part of the ade-
quacy shift and its resulting Foundation Plan as an adequacy
model.18 6 It seems more accurate to describe the litigation and court
decision as equity driven and the remedy ordered as adequacy fo-
cused. The court first determined that equity was required and con-
cluded that this could not be achieved without providing standards for
an adequate education. The court relied on both education and equal
protection clauses to develop this combination of requirements. The
state was thus required to engage in adequacy studies to comply with
the court order to develop an acceptable level of equitable education
spending. Consequently, it may be more prudent to conduct the ade-
quacy studies before commencing litigation so that the results can be
used as evidence to support a claim of denial of equal education
opportunity.
In 2001, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that its state legisla-
ture had created a school financing formula that complied with its
constitutional obligations. On February 23, 2001, in its second Camp-
bell decision, State v. Campbell County School District (Campbell
II),187 the court accepted the Cost-Based Block Grant program and
found the new education finance system capable of fulfilling the Wyo-
184. Id. at 1258-59. For a discussion of the use of "efficient" and "thorough" in state
education clauses, see John Mill & Timothy McLendon, Setting a New Standard
for Public Education: Revision 6 Increases the Duty of the State to Make "Ade-
quate Provision" for Florida Schools, 52 FLA. L. REV. 329, 344-45 (2000).
185. Id. at 1279.
186. The methodology was developed by school finance scholars James Guthrie, of
Vanderbilt University, and Richard Rothstein, of the Economic Policy Institute.
See INSTITUTE FOR WISCONSIN'S FUTURE, FUNDING OUR FUTURE: AN ADEQUACY
MODEL FOR WISCONSIN viii, at http://www.wisconsinsfuture.orgreports/Adequacy
_report6_02.pdf (2002). See also MICHAEL A. REBELL, EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY,
DEMOCRACY, AND THE COURTS IN ACHIEVING HIGH EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS FOR
ALL (T. Ready et al. eds., 2002).
187. 19 P.3d 518 (Wyo. 2001).
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ming Constitution's guarantee of an education.' 8 8 It also, however,
found certain provisions of the model unconstitutional and ruled that
the legislature must remedy these unconstitutional provisions on or
before July 1, 2002. This included a determination that the statutory
scheme failed to change the financing of school capital construction
from local wealth to the wealth of the state as a whole and failed to
provide "constitutionally adequate facilities to school districts that
provide an equal opportunity for a quality education."18 9 State v.
Campbell County School District (Campbell III ),190 a decision on re-
hearing, clarified certain components of the court's earlier decision in
Campbell II and ordered:
As the school districts and the legislature combine their efforts to implement
the legislative plan for capital construction, these fundamental precepts ap-
ply. First, the State is responsible for funding capital construction of facilities
to the level deemed adequate by state standards. Second, the Legislature is in
control of the ultimate amount of spending as it exercises its responsibility of
review and oversight of specific projects proposed by local school districts.
Third, local school districts may supply revenue in excess of Legislative spend-
ing. Lastly, local bonded indebtedness is no longer required. 19 1
Although the taxpayer and pupil equity arguments used in Wyo-
ming can be helpful to rural school districts because a significant por-
tion of Wyoming's population is rural, it should be recognized that
some small and rural school districts opposed the school finance reor-
ganization in Wyoming.192 This was due in part to a controversy that
exists in school finance litigation. Some rural and small school dis-
tricts as well as members of legislatures believe that small schools and
small school districts are entitled to additional funding because they
suffer diseconomies of scale. In many rural districts, this may be true.
What must be kept in mind is that the data to substantiate this belief
must be presented to the court. As the Wyoming court has recognized,
there can be different levels of funding provided to districts as long as
the disparities are cost-justified. Although the Campbell decision is
often cited as an adequacy case, it is clear that the prior decisions in
Washakie and Hinkle resolved questions of equity which were the ba-
sis for the Campbell decision's adequacy remedy.
188. Both the Wyoming Department of Education and the Wyoming Legislature have
created websites with information explaining the new system. The respective
sites are available at http://www.kl2.wy.us/FINANCE/district_funding.htm and
http://legisweb.state.wy.us/schmenu.htm.
189. 19 P.3d at 559.
190. 32 P.3d 325 (Wyo. 2001).
191. Id. at 337.
192. 907 P.2d at 1243, 1251 (stating that twenty-three "small" school districts inter-
vened as defendants).
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3. Applicability to Other States
Although as the Vermont Supreme Court noted, each state's con-
stitutional evolution is unique, the approach taken by the Vermont
and Wyoming courts can be helpful in other states. A thorough and
searching inquiry into the historical and legal origins of the inclusion
of the state educational clause in the constitution in conjunction with
the equal protection clause, and recognition of the fact that education
is specifically mentioned while other benefits are not, could lead to
successful arguments even in states that have previously rejected con-
stitutional claims.19 3 Brigham demonstrates that the lawyers must
take time to painstakingly demonstrate the grievance that their plain-
tiffs suffer and link that suffering to both the education and equal pro-
tection clauses. Like Vermont, in many other states, education is "the
only governmental service considered worthy of constitutional sta-
tus."194 In addition, although the language of each state's education
and equal protection clauses may be different, there are similarities in
the language and the historical basis for enactment that can be used
to find an existing constitutional right to education and an obligation
of equal education opportunity. The Vermont court noted that similar
obligations had been found in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Texas. In
Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.,195 the Kentucky Supreme
Court found that educational opportunities were required to be "sub-
stantially uniform throughout the state" based upon an education
clause that provided: "The General Assembly shall, by appropriate
legislation, provide for an efficient system of common schools through-
out the State."196 In so holding, it affirmed the trial court's accept-
ance of the plaintiffs' arguments that the Kentucky school finance
system violated the equal protection and education provisions of the
Kentucky Constitution. In Tennessee Small School System v.
McWherter,197 the State Supreme Court held that the state education
financing system was required to provide "substantially equal educa-
tional opportunities" based upon its education clause which provides:
The State of Tennessee recognizes the inherent value of education and encour-
ages its support. The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance,
support and eligibility standards of a system of free public schools. The Gen-
eral Assembly may establish and support such postsecondary educational in-
193. See generally John Dayton, An Anatomy of School Funding Litigation, 77 EDUC.
L. REP. 627, 641 (1992) (discussing the court's interpretation of state clauses);
William E. Thro, The Role of Language of the State Education Clauses in School
Finance Litigation, 79 EDuc. L. REP. 19 (1993).
194. Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997).
195. 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989).
196. Ky. CONST § 183.
197. 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993).
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stitutions, including public institutions of higher learning, as it
determines. 1 9 8
If the use of equity-based theory could have been considered no
longer viable, Tennessee's reliance upon the state's equal protection
clause revived it. The court held that Tennessee's reliance on local
sales and property taxes violated the state's equal protection clause
because the finance system was irrational. In Edgewood Independent
School District v. Kirby,199 the Texas Supreme Court relied upon the
state's education clause, but used equity language when it found a re-
quirement for "substantially equal access to similar revenues per pu-
pil" in the education clause which provides:
A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the
liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the
State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and mainte-
nance of an efficient system of public free schools.2 00
The populations in Vermont and Wyoming are overwhelmingly
white and therefore racially homogenous, 201 however, there have been
favorable equity decisions in states that have significant rural minor-
ity student populations and where the plaintiffs were seeking relief for
districts with minority populations. 202 For example, in Kasayulie v.
State,20 3 named for plaintiff Willie Kasayulie of the Akiachak Native
Community in Alaska, plaintiffs in Alaska filed a lawsuit that in-
cluded "adequacy" and "equity" claims. The plaintiffs alleged that the
state school finance system for funding facilities projects discrimi-
nated against rural Native American students in violation of the
state's education and equal protection clause. The Alaska Superior
Court agreed that the system discriminated against Native Americans
and held that the method of funding facilities was unconstitutional
198. TENN. CONST art. XI, § 12.
199. 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
200. TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
201. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU. STATE POPULATION RANKINGS SUMMARY: 1995 AND
2025, available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/9525rank.
html (last visited June 8, 2003). See also Erin E. Buzuvis, Note, "A" for Effort:
Evaluating Recent State Education Reform in Response to Judicial Demands for
Equity and Adequacy, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 644, 647 (2001).
202. The racial composition of the plaintiff class may have some effect on school fi-
nance litigation as well as the implementation of a favorable decision. See gener-
ally Baker & Green supra note 4; Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and
Resegregation of American Public Education: The Courts' Role, 81 N.C. L. REV.
1597 (2003); Dyson, supra note 4; Morgan, supra note 4; James E. Ryan, The
Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L. REV. 432 (1999) (review-
ing the history of modern school finance litigation, and suggesting that racial
considerations may still drive judicial and legislative resolutions in many of these
cases).
203. Kasayulie v. State, No. 3AN 97-3782CTV, slip op. at 8 (Alaska Sept. 1, 1999).
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since education is a fundamental right in Alaska.204 In Lake View
School District Number 25 of Phillips County v. Huckabee,205 the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court found the state's system of school finance was
both inequitable and inadequate based upon education and equal pro-
tection clauses of the Arkansas Constitution. Lake View is a one-
school rural district. All of its students are African-American. The
court emphasized the overlap between equity and adequacy and found
that "[d]eficiencies in certain public schools in certain school districts
can sustain a finding of inadequacy but also, when compared to other
schools in other districts, a finding of inequality."2 06
Much of the criticism of the use of equity-based theories in school
finance litigation results from a focus on remedies. Some courts that
rejected plaintiffs' claims did so because plaintiffs failed to show a link
between unequal funding and denial of an adequate education, 20 7 or
convince the courts that the state constitution recognizes education as
a constitutional right in a way that other benefits are not recog-
nized. 20 8 Some courts believed either that it was too difficult to deter-
mine an appropriate remedy or that if a remedy was ordered, it could
apply to many government benefits. Additionally, favorable court de-
cisions have sometimes met strong opposition in the implementation
stage because there has been a failure to agree upon what is needed
for an adequate education for all children.209 This criticism empha-
204. Id.; see generally Rural School Construction and Maintenance Bond Package Of-
fered, TribalNews.com, at http://www.tribalnews.comilal/3-1_construction.htm
(Feb. 28, 2002).
205. 91 S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 2002), cert. denied, Wilson v. Huckabee, 123 S.Ct. 2097
(2003).
206. Id. at 496.
207. See, e.g., Gould v. Orr, 244 Neb. 163, 169, 506 N.W.2d 349, 353 (1993) (dismissing
plaintiffs petition without leave to amend because "no reasonable possibility ex-
ists that plaintiff will, by amendment, be able to state a cause of action" and
where plaintiffs alleged that unequal funding equals inadequate education); Lev-
ittown v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369 (N.Y. 1982) (acknowledging per-pupil
spending discrepancies, but concluding such discrepancies alone did not rise to a
constitutional violation, leaving open the possibility of a constitutional violation
if "gross and glaring" inadequacy could be shown).
208. See generally Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 144-45 (Or. 1976) (expressing fear that
a holding that education is a fundamental "interest" would apply to the state
constitution's liquor by the drink provision); Kelly Thompson Cochran, Comment,
Beyond School Financing: Defining the Constitutional Right to an Adequate Edu-
cation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 399, 404-09 (2000) (citing Hornbeck v. Somerset County
Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 786 (Md. 1983) (expressing concern about creating a
fundamental rights precedent that would apply to constitutional provisions on
parking and loan financing)).
209. Michael Rebell, Financing Our Future Education Improvements for the 21st Cen-
tury, Panel Three Commentary - Rodriguez Revisited: An Optimist's View, 1998
ANN. SURV. Am. L. 289, 296 (1998) (noting that equity-based claims lost their
plausibility when they went to the remedial stage).
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sizes the need to include both equity-based and adequacy-based claims
in litigation.2 10
In some states it may seem futile for rural districts to pursue liti-
gation, either because there is an unfavorable court opinion in the
state, litigation exists but does not include rural districts, or a
favorable judgment exists but the political branches have failed to pro-
vide appropriate remedies by demonstrating that the rural districts
are suffering from the same inequities as successful urban district
plaintiffs.2 11 In the face of unfavorable court opinions, equity-based
arguments that have succeeded in the courts in some states may be
persuasive arguments in the political process by directing arguments
to the legislature or the governor which can lead to a restructuring of
the school finance formula. Where litigation may seem futile or ill-
advised, convincing legislatures of the existing inequities to rural stu-
dents and taxpayers and disparities in educational opportunity may
be the first step to triggering equitable funding.2 12 Additionally, rural
districts may be able to benefit from existing court ordered remedies
by demonstrating that the rural districts are suffering from the same
inequities as successful urban district plaintiffs.2 13 If lawsuits have
been filed and failed using adequacy arguments but not including eq-
uity arguments because the challengers were convinced that the
"third wave" required adequacy claims, it may, nevertheless, be possi-
ble to frame claims around equal protection clauses or use equity-
based language in connection with education clause claims. 2 14
If there is no court order or there is a court order holding that there
is no fundamental right to an education, a legislature could be con-
vinced that it can enact an equitable finance system that will survive
a constitutional challenge. Presumably, if faced with a challenge to
such a system, courts in these states will find that it satisfies the ra-
210. See Rebell supra note 87, at 704-05 (stating that "[ildeally, a remedy for a fiscal
equity case would be based on both minimum adequacy and egalitarian
concepts").
211. See generally Frank Macchiarola & Joseph G. Diaz, Disorder in the Courts: The
Aftermath of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez in the State
Courts, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 551 (1996).
212. Legislatures will be influenced by other factors such as economic and political
conditions existing in the state. See generally Patt, supra note 49 (discussing
political factors, including public opinion, as influencing successes in school fi-
nance reform).
213. See, e.g., Keaveney v. N.J. Dept. of Educ., EDU 2637-00, 2000 N.J. AGEN LEXIS
814 (2000) (on file with the Nebraska College of Law Library). Seventeen rural
school districts met the first threshold to receive additional funding as a "special
needs" district as had 30 urban districts in Abbott v. Burke litigation.
214. See generally Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Re-
form Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307 (1991) (categorizing education clauses
in relation to their use of equity language).
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tional basis test.2 15 Equity-based claims can succeed if there is either
a favorable determination by the courts or acceptance of the existence
of the inequalities by the state legislature. Recent school reform that
has been initiated without favorable court opinions includes a 1994
Michigan school financing ballot initiative which increased sales taxes
and reduced property tax as the primary method of obtaining public
school revenue,216 with funding provided to school districts on a per-
pupil basis.217 After an unsuccessful court challenge 218 school finance
reform was also initiated in Maryland relying on both equity and ade-
quacy principles. 219
Plaintiffs in lawsuits that include rural school districts continue to
include equity-based theories. A lawsuit was filed in Iowa in April
2002 alleging that the state school finance system violates both the
State equal protection and education clauses. 220 The Williams v.
State of California221 lawsuit also alleges violations of the State's
equal protection and education clauses. The Williams complaint
stresses principles of equity as it opens with the following paragraph:
Tens of thousands of children attending public schools located throughout the
State of California are being deprived of basic educational opportunities avail-
able to more privileged children attending the majority of the State's public
schools. State law requires students to attend school. Yet, all too many Cali-
fornia school children must go to schools that shock the conscience. Those
215. See generally L. Darnell Weeden, Creating Race-Neutral Diversity in Federal Pro-
curement in a Post-Adarand World, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 951, 976 (2002) ("Al-
though a state is not required to remedy the disparities in educational funding, it
may do so ... using the rational basis test because economic equalization based
on a race-neutral factor, such as the disparity in property tax values, unlike race,
is not a suspect classification.")
216. MICH. CONST. art. 9, §§ 8, 11.
217. See generally Lundberg, supra note 21, at 1138-39 (arguing that the Michigan
system is not viewed as satisfactory and that rural districts are not faring well
under per-pupil distribution system) (citing Alex Rodriguez, What Reform Taught
Michigan Series: School Funding Reform, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Mar. 24, 1997, at 6));
Leon N. Mayer, Durant v. State of Michigan: The Interaction of the Headlee
Amendment to the Michigan Constitution and Funding for Special Education
Provided by the State to Local School Districts, 1998 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U. L.
REV. 893 (1998).
218. Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983).
219. See MD. CODE ANN., §§ 5-201, 5-202 (2003). See generally NATIONAL EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION, SCHOOL FUNDING ADEQUACY - WHAT IT COSTS To Do THE JOB
RIGHT, at http://www.nea.org/neatoday/0209/newsl8.html (2002).
220. Petition for Declarative Judgment and Injunctive Relief, Coalition for a Common
Cents Solution v. State, (Iowa Dist. Ct. Warren Co. 2002) (on file with the Ne-
braska College of Law Library). See Matthew M. Craft, Note, Lost and Found:
The Unequal Distribution of Local Option Sales Tax Revenue Among Iowa
Schools, 88 IowA L. REV. 199 (2002) (discussing the relevance of the Iowa lawsuit
to rural districts).
221. No. 312 236 (Cal. Super. Ct., S.F. County, filed Nov. 14, 2000) (on file with the
Nebraska College of Law Library). See Meredith May, ACLU Sues State Over
Public School Conditions, S.F. CHRONICLE, May 18, 2000, at A3.
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schools lack the bare essentials required of a free and common school educa-
tion that the majority of students throughout the State enjoy: trained teach-
ers, necessary educational supplies, classrooms, even seats in classrooms, and
facilities that meet basic health and safety standards. Students must there-
fore attempt to learn without books and sometimes without any teachers, and
in schools that lack functioning heating or air conditioning systems, that lack
sufficient numbers of functioning toilets, and that are infested with vermin,
including rats, mice, and cockroaches. These appalling conditions in Califor-
nia public schools represent extreme departures from accepted educational
standards and yet they have persisted for years and have worsened over time.
Students who are forced to attend schools with these conditions are deprived
of essential educational opportunities to learn. Plaintiffs bring this suit in an
effort to ensure that their schools meet basic minimal educational norms.2 2 2
B. Federal Solutions
Even in the early stages of school finance litigation, some scholars
recognized the need to rethink the system of school finance that relied
too heavily upon local property taxes. As Professor Annette Johnson
put it in 1979, "[i]f a state without a previous history of public educa-
tion financing were now proposing the initiation of a plan, it is highly
unlikely that the system of dual responsibility for school financing...
would be adopted." 223 Since the subsequent decades of litigation have
led to various remedies which many have deemed unsuccessful in
eliminating the inequitable disparities,224 since there are disparities
among the several states as well as within, and since the United
States Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of education to
the country, this discussion of possibilities for achieving equity in ru-
ral schools finance would not be complete without some consideration
of the role of the federal government.
In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court stated that, "it is doubt-
ful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education."225 Even in Rodriguez when
the Court failed to find a violation of the federal equal protection
clause, Justice Powell declared that "the need is apparent for reform
in tax systems which may well have relied too long and too heavily on
the local property tax. And certainly innovative thinking as to public
education, its methods, and its funding is necessary to assure both a
higher level of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity."2 26
While Justice Powell probably had in mind the role of state govern-
222. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 1, Williams v. State of Califor-
nia, No. 312236 (Cal. Super. Ct., S.F. County, filed Nov. 14, 2000) (on file with the
Nebraska College of Law Library).
223. Johnson, supra note 6, at 327-28 (footnote omitted).
224. See, e.g., William E. Thro, Commentary: Judicial Paradigms of Educational
Equality, 174 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 28 (2003).
225. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
226. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973).
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ment, his words are equally applicable to the question of the role of
the federal government in improving finance systems for public school
education. It is clear that the federal government has a role in public
school education, but it is unclear how that role should be defined.
There is a need for an increased role of the federal government in
public school financing. Perhaps that role is with the federal courts in
scrutinizing state finance systems, or perhaps it is with the political
branches in the provision of a federal funding system, or perhaps both.
This part of the article briefly considers how the role of the federal
government should be considered when developing a school finance
strategy by exploring three possible areas: (1) Federal Equal Protec-
tions claims; (2) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and (3) other
federal legislation.
1. Federal Equal Protection
Since the Rodriguez decision, most courts and litigants have con-
cluded that alleging a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution as a ground for invalidating state systems
of school finance is futile. The plaintiffs in Brigham accepted the trial
court's rejection of their federal equal protection claims.227 The Wyo-
ming Supreme Court noted that Rodriguez made it clear that the issue
of education finance is left to the states. 228 It is not surprising that
many would conclude that there is no longer an equal protection claim
that can be brought before the federal courts. 22 9 That assumption is
based upon the Rodriguez holding that education is not a fundamental
right. However, as noted above, there are two other claims available
to prove that a state has violated the Equal Protection Clause: dis-
crimination against a suspect class and failure of the state to meet the
rational basis test. In addition, the Supreme Court has indicated that
under some circumstances it may be possible to establish the exis-
tence of a fundamental right in connection with a challenge of a state
financing system.230
First, it may be possible to restructure the class to meet the defini-
tion of a suspect class. According to Rodriguez, the challengers of a
state financing system would need to establish that the state system
227. Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 387 (1997) (nothing that a joint appeal was filed
expect for the dismissal of the Federal Equal Protection claims).
228. State v. Campbell County Sch. Dist. ("Campbell III"), 32 P.3d 325, 338-39 (Wyo.
2001).
229. See generally Gary A. Allison, School Vouchers: The Educational Silver Bullet, or
an Ideological Blank Round?, 38 TUL. L. REV. 329, 359 (2002); Quentin A. Pal-
frey, The State Judiciary's Role in Fulfilling Brown's Promise, 8 MICH. J. RACE &
L. 1, 16 (2002); Joseph S. Patt, School Finance Battles: Survey Says? It's All Just
a Change in Attitudes, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 547, 548 (1999).
230. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 266 (1986). See infra text accompanying notes
233-235.
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disadvantages a definable class of the "poor" and that there was an
absolute deprivation of education. 2 3 1 The Wyoming litigation resulted
in the court focusing on districts, rather than persons. There, the liti-
gants were able to show that there was a difference in the education
provided to children based upon the wealth of districts, rather than
the wealth of persons. The deprivation could perhaps be demon-
strated by referring to the standards that are set by the state to mea-
sure an "adequate" education. If the children in a property poor
district consistently fail to meet the state standards, they are being
deprived of the entitlement that the state has defined.
Second, an equal protection violation that is not based upon depri-
vation of a fundamental right or a suspect class can still be successful
if the state's finance system fails the rational basis test. The Vermont
Supreme Court found that its state system failed both the strict scru-
tiny and rational basis test.2 32 A state system could be challenged on
the basis that disparate treatment received under a finance system
does not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.
Finally, a claim can be structured to articulate a fundamental in-
terest. Recently, equal protection claims have at least survived a mo-
tion to dismiss in a school finance case filed in Kansas. In Robinson v.
Kansas,2 33 a lawsuit was filed alleging that the Kansas school finance
system, which allocated disproportionately large amounts of state
funding to low enrollment districts, and authorized districts to adopt
local option budgets to provide additional school funding, violated
their federal statutory and constitutional rights. The suit was
brought on behalf of minority, foreign, and disabled students attend-
ing large, non-affluent school districts, and included a claim that the
system violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In rejecting the state's motion for dismissal
of this claim, the court referred to the Supreme Court's opinion in
Papasan v. Allain,2 34 which held that the unequal distribution of state
resources available for education violated the Equal Protection Clause
if such differential treatment was not rationally related to a legitimate
state interest.23 5 The United States Supreme Court stated in
Papasan that it had "not yet definitively settled the questions whether
a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right and whether a
231. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 20-23, 25 (noting that in its prior cases, individuals
had proven that they sustained an absolute deprivation of a desired benefit, how-
ever, in Rodriguez, there was no evidence of an absolute deprivation of
education).
232. See Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 395-396 (1997).
233. 117 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Kan. 2000), affd 295 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2002).
234. 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
235. Robinson, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 1147.
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statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should be ac-
corded heightened equal protection review." 23 6
2. Title VI
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibits federal fund re-
cipients from discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national ori-
gin.23 7 Challenges to state public school funding schemes under Title
VI are possible because states accept federal money to support public
schools. Plaintiffs in a number of states have successfully included
Title VI challenges in their lawsuits. 2 38 The claims are similar to
claims of inequity under state law and generally focus on disparities
in inputs such as funds for textbooks, teachers, and facilities. Title VI
claims may be of particular help to rural school districts that include a
high percentage of minority students. 2 39 For example, in Powell v.
Ridge,240 the plaintiffs alleged that Pennsylvania's education funding
formula denied an equal educational opportunity to minority students
because it gave less revenue per child to students in school districts
with high proportions of minority students than to students in simi-
larly situated, predominantly white school districts. The Third Cir-
cuit held that the plaintiffs had stated a claim under Title VI and its
implementing regulations. The court reversed the trial court's dismis-
sal of the plaintiffs claim, holding that the Title VI disparate impact
claim could go forward and noting that the plaintiffs will have to
prove:
(1) that less educational funding is provided by the Commonwealth to school
districts attended by most non-white students in Pennsylvania than to school
districts attended by most white students, (2) that the school districts at-
tended by most non-white students in Pennsylvania receive less total educa-
tional funding than do the school districts attended by most white students,
(3) that these disparities in funding are produced by the Commonwealth's
funding formula, and (4) that the funding disparities injure nonwhite stu-
dents by limiting their educational opportunities. 2 4 1
The Alaska lawsuit filed in Kasayulie v. State242 also included a
Title VI claim. In granting plaintiffs' motion for partial summary
236. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 285. See generally Baker & Green, supra note 4.
237. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, Pub. L. 88-352; 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2003).
238. See, e.g., Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999) (challenging Philadelphia
school system financing), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1046 (1999); Robinson v. Kansas,
117 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Kan. 2000); Caesar v. Pataki, 2000 WL 1154318
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2000); Kasayulie v. State, No. SAN 97-3782CTV, slip op. at 11
(Alaska Sup. Ct. 1999); Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475,
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
239. See generally Dyson, supra note 4; Morgan, supra note 4.
240. 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999).
241. Powell, 189 F.3d at 395 (footnote omitted).
242. Kasayulie v. State, No. 3AN 97-3782CTV, slip op. at 8 (Alaska Sup. Ct. Sept. 1,
1999).
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judgment, Judge John Reese of the Anchorage Superior Court ruled
that a disparity existed between rural Native schools and urban white
schools and that rural schools and rural school children were routinely
denied equal access to opportunities in education in violation of the
implementing regulations of Title VI.243
These successes became of questionable value when the United
States Supreme Court, in Alexander v. Sandoval,244 ruled that the Ti-
tle VI regulation establishing a "disparate-impact" standard of dis-
crimination does not provide a "private right of action."245 This 2001
decision has called into question the viability of future Title VI claims.
However, the Department of Education can continue to find violations
of its regulations246 and private claims based upon Title VI violations
may be possible under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.247 Section 1983 provides, in
relevant part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress
248
The lower courts are divided on the availability of section 1983
claims.249
243. See supra text accompanying notes 202-203.
244. 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (challenging Alabama's English-only driver's license exam
based on the implementing regulations of Title VI).
245. Id. at 291-92.
246. The DOE regulations forbid funding recipients to "utilize criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination
because of their race, color, or national origin, or have the effect of defeating or
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as re-
spect individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin." 34 C.F.R.
§ 100.3(b)(2) (2002).
247. See generally Dyson supra note 4; Bradford C. Mank, Using § 1983 to Enforce
Title VI's Section 602 Regulations, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 321 (2001); Morgan, supra
note 4; Kevin G. Welner, Tracking in an Era of Standards: Low-Expectation Clas-
ses Meet High- Expectation Laws, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 699 (2001); Judith A.
Winston, Achieving Excellence and Equal Opportunity in Education: No Conflict
of Laws, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 997, 1016 (2001); Derek Black, Comment, Picking up
the Pieces After Alexander v. Sandoval: Resurrecting a Private Cause of Action for
Disparate Impact, 81 N.C. L. REV. 356 (2002).
248. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002).
249. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 788 (3d
Cir. 2001) ("EPA's disparate impact regulations cannot create a federal right en-
forceable through section 1983."); rev'g 145 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D. N.J. 2001) (hold-
ing that private parties may rely on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the federal rights
in EPA's Title VI § 602 disparate impact implementing regulations); Loschiavo v.
City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548, 553 (6th Cir. 1994) (allowing a § 1983 suit to en-
force rights under FCC regulations); White v. Engler, 188 F. Supp. 2d 730 (E.D.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Title VI claims are also pending in Kansas and California. In
Robinson v. Kansas,2 50 a decision following Sandoval, the Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's holding and noted that the plaintiffs
were willing to amend their complaint to bring their Title VI claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce section 602 regulations. The Robin-
son court stated that the Sandoval "decision does not bar all claims to
enforce such regulations, but only disparate impact claims brought by
private parties directly under Title VI. Disparate impact claims may
still be brought against state officials for prospective injunctive relief
through an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce section 602 regu-
lations."2 51 Thus, instead of a direct claim under Title VI, rural plain-
tiffs could bring a private action under section 1983 to enforce rights
contained in the Title VI disparate impact regulations adopted by the
United States Department of Education.
The class action lawsuit, Williams v. California,252 alleged that the
failure of California's public schools to provide necessary learning
tools had a racially disparate impact in violation of the equal protec-
tion and due process clauses of the California Constitution and Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its implementing regulations. 2 53
The plaintiffs in Williams include primarily low-income children, im-
migrant children, and children of color.
Although neither of the cases specifically alleged that they are di-
rected at reforms in rural districts, the Kansas and California deci-
sions will have a major impact on rural students. Nearly half the
schools in Kansas are rural2 54 and in California, the percentage of stu-
dents enrolled in rural schools who are minorities is 41% in compari-
son to the national percentage of 18.6%.255 The Rural Trust has
concluded that the need for attention to California rural schools is
critical.256
3. Additional Legislation
The need to continue pursuing federal relief is particularly impor-
tant in rural states that have adverse state supreme court opinions
Mich. 2001) (holding that plaintiffs may bring a § 1983 action to enforce Title VI
regulations).
250. 117 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Kan. 2000), affg, 295 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2002).
251. See Robinson, 295 F.3d at 1187 (footnotes omitted).
252. No. 312 236 (Cal. Super. Ct., S.F. County, filed Nov. 14, 2000) (on file with the
University of Nebraska College of Law). See Meredith May, ACLU Sues State
over Public School Conditions, S.F. CHRONICLE, May 18, 2000, at A3.
253. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 46-49, Williams v. California,
No. 312 236 (Cal. Super. Ct., S.F. County, filed Nov. 14, 2000) (on file with the
University of Nebraska College of Law Library).
254. Beeson & Strange, supra note 34, at 40.
255. Id. at 29.
256. Id.
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interpreting the education and equal protection clauses of the state
constitution. Some scholars have suggested that the school finance
reform is now in its fourth wave which may rely more heavily on fed-
eral relief.2 57 New efforts are needed in this area and it is apparent
that these efforts must include the federal government. In addition to
pursuing federal litigation strategies, actions should be considered
that are aimed at convincing the political branches of the federal gov-
ernment that it is time for a new way of thinking about financing pub-
lic school education. The Supreme Court in Rodriguez recognized that
even though the Texas plaintiffs had not proved an equal protection
claim, there did exist a need for "innovative thinking as to public edu-
cation, its methods, and its funding ... to assure both a higher level of
quality and greater uniformity of opportunity."258 Arguably, the No
Child Left Behind Act of 2001 ("NCLB"), which was signed into law on
January 8, 2002, is meant to address the need for a "high quality edu-
cation,"259 but its provision for an expanded role of the federal govern-
ment in public school education26O fails to address the funding issue of
a "greater uniformity of opportunity." NCLB states its purpose as fol-
lows: "The purpose of this title is to ensure that all children have a
fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality educa-
tion and reach, at a minimum, proficiency on challenging State aca-
demic achievement standards and state academic assessments."261 In
part, to fulfill this purpose, the Act requires states to develop a plan
that ensures all teachers are highly qualified by the 2005-06 school
257. For discussions of Title VI as a fourth wave strategy, see Dyson, supra note 4, at
18-19; Erving, supra note 77; Morgan, supra note 4, at 173; Kevin Randall Mc-
Millan, Note, The Turning Tide: The Emerging Fourth Wave of School Finance
Reform Litigation and The Courts' Lingering Institutional Concerns, 58 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1867 (1998).
258. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 58.
259. Pub. L. No. 107-110, Stat. 1469, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301 (2002). See also U.S. DEPT. OF
EDUC., INSIDE No CHILD LEFT BEHIND, at httpJ/www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/
oese/index.html (last visited October 12, 2003) ("The Act is the most sweeping
reform of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) since ESEA was
enacted in 1965. It redefines the federal role in K-12 education and will help
close the achievement gap between disadvantaged and minority students and
their peers. It is based on four basic principles: stronger accountability for re-
sults, increased flexibility and local control, expanded options for parents, and an
emphasis on teaching methods that have been proven to work.") (on file with the
author). ESEA, which was first enacted in 1965, is the principal federal law af-
fecting K-12 education. The No Child Left Behind Act is the most recent
reauthorization of the ESEA. ESEA Title I provides financial assistance through
state educational agencies (SEAs) to local educational agencies (LEAs) and
schools with high numbers or percentages of poor children.
260. See generally, RHONDA E. SCHNEIDER, ESQ., MASS. DEPT. OF EDUC., THE STATE
AND FEDERAL ROLES IN MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2003); Ronald D.
Wenkart, Commentary: The No Child Left Behind Act and Congress' Power to
Regulate Under the Spending Clause, 174 EDUC. L. REP. 589 (May 8, 2003).
261. 20 U.S.C. § 6301.
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year.2 6 2 State educational systems are accountable to the federal gov-
ernment pursuant to the NCLB, if they contain public schools that
receive funding under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act. 26 3 The expanded role of the federal government in public
education was not accompanied by the necessary increases in funding.
Appropriations for increased funding under NCBL were significantly
reduced in part because of increased demands for funding related to
terrorism concerns. 2 64 The imposition of new requirements without
funding places rural schools in even more vulnerable positions when
they exist in states that do not have equitable funding systems.
As one scholar has stated, NCLB "is an important goal that will be
difficult to realize when educational funding policies of a state lead to
the distribution of financial and educational resources in an inequita-
ble . . .fashion."26 5 Legislation such as Title VI, Part B of NCLB,
Rural Education Initiatives, 266 along with appropriate funding, could
provide rural school districts with the funding needed for research to
determine the appropriate level of resources for rural schools as well
as direct funding for the schools. This part of NCLB establishes a Ru-
ral Education Achievement Program ("REAP") which is aimed at
small and rural schools and authorizes local education agencies 26 7 to
use program funds for: (1) teacher recruitment and retention; (2) pro-
fessional development; (3) educational technology; (4) parental in-
volvement activities; (5) activities authorized under Safe and Drug-
Free Schools; (6) activities authorized under Part A of Title I for high
poverty schools; and (7) activities authorized under Title III for lan-
guage instruction for limited English proficient and immigrant stu-
dents.268 The goals expressed in NCLB accompanied by significant
additional funding to meet its mandates could be used to help achieve
equitable funding for rural schools. NCLB could also serve as the
model for other legislation aimed at providing equal education oppor-
tunity within and between states.
262. Id. at § 6319.
263. Id. at §§ 6301-6578.
264. See generally Maurice R. Dyson, Leave No Child Behind: Normative Proposals to
Link Education Adequacy Claims and High Stakes Assessment Due Process Chal-
lenges, 7 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 67 (2002).
265. Dyson, supra note 4, at 17-18.
266. 20 U.S.C. § 7341 (2002) (originally enacted as part of the Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriation Act for fiscal year 2001 and reauthorized under NCLB).
267. A local education agency (LEA) is a public board of education or other public au-
thority within a State which maintains administrative control of public elemen-
tary or secondary schools in a city, county, township, school district, or other
political subdivision of a state. See supra note 258.
268. See NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, CONGRESSIONAL ISSUES OVERVIEW: RURAL
EDUCATION, at http://www.nea.org/rural/l acoverview-rural.html (2002).
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V. CONCLUSION
This review of equity and adequacy theories as a part of rural
school finance strategy suggests that the two litigation theories are
interrelated so much that they do not provide such distinct waves of
litigation as some have argued. The equity issue can be viewed as the
articulation of the duties and obligations imposed by state constitu-
tions. While the adequacy issue focuses on the appropriate remedies
that the legislature will need to enact to provide an equitable system,
the likelihood of success for other rural plaintiffs seems to be best
when reliance is placed on both the state equal protection and educa-
tion clauses. The complexities of implementing remedies suggest that
a move toward federal constitutional claims and statutory solutions
should also be pursued. Experience shows that litigation may not be
the most productive avenue for reform in all situations. School reform
strategies must include a consideration of the role of the political
branches of government both on the state and federal levels in the
pursuit for equity in education for rural schools.
